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INTRODUCTION
A. Background to the Conflicte
The conflict in Sierra Leone began in 1991 when the rebel
Revolutionary United Front (R.U.F./S.L.) entered Sierra Leone
from Liberia. The conflict started after many years of misrule,
corruption, and governmental neglect of the population that
characterized the polity in Sierra Leone.
Sierra Leone became a Crown Colony in 1808 and was, thus,
the first modem political State in sub-Saharan Africa. It became
an independent State in 1961 after many years of colonial rule.
At independence, Sir Milton Margai of the Sierra Leone Peoples'
Party (S.L.P.P.) became its first Prime Minister and was suc-
ceeded by his brother Albert Margai in 1964. Within two years,
Albert Margai's rule was characterized by high levels of official
corruption and mismanagement. In addition, Albert Margai
made efforts to create a one-party State by amending the
constitution.
1. See generally Report from David Pratt, M.P., Nepean-Carleton, Special
Envoy to Sierra Leone to the Honourable Lloyd Axworthy P.C., M.P, Minister of
Foreign Affairs, Sierra Leone: The Forgotten Crisis, at http://www.sierra-
leone.org/pratt042399.html (Apr. 23, 1999). See alsoJoseph Opala, Sierra Leone:
A Brief Overview, at http://slcgg.com/opala96.htm (Apr. 1996).
CONFLICT IN SIERRA LEONE
The 1967 General Elections in Sierra Leone were badly mis-
managed and there were charges of vote rigging and corruption.
The All Peoples' Congress (A.P.C.) appeared to have the most
parliament seats and its leader, Siaka Stevens, was asked by the
Governor-General to form the new Government. Stevens had
been part of the S.L.P.P., but shortly before independence had
broken with Milton Margai and formed the A.P.C.
The same day that Stevens was asked to form a Government,
Army Commander David Lansana declared martial law and
arrested both the Governor-General and Stevens on the ground
that all election results had not been tallied. Three days later, as
it was apparent that his intention was to restore Margai to power,
Lansana was arrested by junior officers who proceeded to estab-
lish a military Government. One year later, the junior officers
were overthrown by noncommissioned officers, who then invited
Stevens to return from exile and form a new Government.
In 1971, Sierra Leone became a republic, with Siaka Stevens
as the Executive President. Stevens ruled for seventeen years,
during which he gradually became a corrupt politician and dicta-
tor. He established a repressive and brutal regime in which
rights violations became rampant.2 There was a systematic sub-
version of the formal State apparatus and the growth of the infor-
mal economy, largely based on trade in illicit diamonds, the
main mineral resource of Sierra Leone.
Generally, in the 1960s and 1970s, a "weak post-indepen-
dence democracy was subverted by despotism and State-spon-
sored corruption. Economic decline ... followed." ' By the mid-
1980s, the country was descending into insolvency. Growing for-
eign debt, rampant inflation, currency devaluation, budget defi-
cits, corruption, and declining exports led to chronic fuel,
power, and food shortages. Youth unemployment grew, and stu-
dent radicalism at Fourah Bay University increased. By 1985, a
year marked by violent labor and student unrest, Stevens was
over eighty years old and decided to retire. He handed over
power to Joseph Momoh, who had been the military
commander.4
2. See Pratt, supra note 1, at Part I-Background: The Stevens Years: 1968-
85.
3. Ian Smillie, Lansana Gberie & Ralph Hazleton, The Heart of the Matter:
Sierra Leone, Diamonds and Human Security, at Introduction, at http://www.sierra-
leone.org/heartmatter.html (Jan. 2000).
4. See Pratt, supra note 1, at Part I-Background: The Stevens Years: 1968-
85. See also Ibrahim Abdullah & Patrick Muana, The Revolutionary United Front oJ
Sierra Leone, in AnucA GUERRILLAS 172, 175-76 (Christopher Clapham. ed.,
1998).
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The Momoh years were more of the same. Momoh had
come to power, riding a wave of public enthusiasm, and it was
hoped he might make things better for the economy and revive
the collapsing State. However, corruption continued, as did high
inflation, repeated blackouts, and shortages of currency, food,
and fuel.5
The Momoh years were also characterized by two largely
unnoticed trends that would have serious consequences later.6
The first trend was a steady and rapid growth in the number of
the unemployed and disaffected youth.7 They drifted from the
countryside to either Freetown, the capital, or to the diamond
fields of Kono, and were deeply influenced by the climate of vio-
lence, drugs, and criminality. The second trend was a growth in
student militancy. During the late 1980s, partly due to the Gov-
ernment's violent suppression of demonstrations, many students
became radicalized. Exposure to new ideas, including Colonel
Muammar Ghaddafi's The Green Book, also contributed to student
radicalism.' The students had even formed a Green Book study
club.9 Libya openly sponsored students from Sierra Leone who
wanted to travel to Libya until 1985, when forty-one students with
alleged links to Libya were violently expelled.' ° From 1987 to
1988, between twenty-five and fifty Sierra Leoneans were trained
in Libya in the "art of revolution."1'
The first shots in the conflict in Sierra Leone were fired on
March 23, 1991, when the R.U.F./S.L. entered Sierra Leone
from Liberia. 12 Momoh had to hurriedly recruit new troops to
fight the guerrillas and these new recruits were mainly the urban
youth who were disenchanted with the regime and the political
leaders. The new recruits were "mostly drifters, rural and urban
unemployed, a fair number of hooligans, drug addicts and
thieves. ' 13 They lacked the necessary logistical support and soon
began to brutally exploit civilians in the war zone.'
4
5. See Pratt, supra note 1, at Part I-Background: The Momoh Years: 1985-




9. See Abdullah & Muana, supra note 4, at 175.
10. See Pratt, supra note 1, at Part I-Background: The Momoh Years:
1985-92; see also Abdullah & Muana, supra note 4, at 176.
11. Pratt, supra note 1, at Part I-Background: The Momoh Years: 1985-92;
see also Abdullah & Muana, supra note 4, at 176-77.
12. See Abdullah & Muana, supra note 4, at 178.
13. Id. at 182.
14. See id.
CONFLICT IN SIERRA LEONE
Young military officers who were protesting pay and condi-
tions in the war front overthrew Joseph Momoh on April 29,
1992. The new regime, the National Provisional Ruling Council
(N.P.R.C.), was headed by 29-year-old Army Captain Valentine
Strasser. The N.P.R.C. declared a revolution and a commitment
to end the war, revamp the economy, and restore multi-party
democracy. It entered into negotiations with the R.U.F., which
ultimately floundered. The initial enthusiasm to end the war
soon waned as the young officers became mired in the corrup-
tion that had characterized the previous regime. Meanwhile, the
troops on the war front became hardly distinguishable from the
rebels, and outside the war zone civilians came to detest the
army, which had been expanded by the N.P.R.C. The soldiers
were suspected of committing atrocities like the rebels and the
term "sobel" (a combination of "soldiers" and "rebels") was
coined to account for the criminal behavior of these recruits.
1 5
The young officers promised elections for February 1996.
However, in January 1996, Strasser was overthrown by his deputy,
Brigadier Julius Maada Bio. Pressure mounted on the regime to
hold the elections as scheduled, since the coup was construed as
an attempt by the military to hold onto power. The R.U.F. main-
tained pressure on the Government and talks were held between
them only a few days before the elections, which eventually took
place in March 1996. Talks between the Government and the
R.U.F. continued with the newly elected Government of Presi-
dent Ahmed Tejan Kabbah. 16
B. Impact of the Crises in Liberia
The conflict in Sierra Leone, which began during the civil
war in Liberia, has been linked with the Liberian conflict.
Charles Taylor, the Liberian warlord who later became the Presi-
dent of Liberia, was seen as a principal backer and possibly initia-
tor of the conflict in Sierra Leone. Corporal Foday Sankoh, head
of the R.U.F., had formed an alliance with Taylor, who helped
him to launch the conflict. The conflict was seen as Taylor's way
of getting even with the Joseph Momoh regime in Sierra Leone,
which had backed the efforts of the West African regional body,
Economic Community of West African States (E.C.O.W.A.S.),' 7
15. See id. at 183.
16. See Pratt, supra note 1, at Part I-Background: The N.P.R.C. Regime:
1992-96; see also Abdullah & Muana, supra note 4, at 187.
17. Economic Community of West African States, founded in 1975, under
the Treaty of The Economic Community of West African States (E.C.O.W.A.S.).
See Treaty of The Economic Community of West African States (E.C.O.W.A.S.)
14 I.L.M. 1200 (May 28, 1975).
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in its attempt to bring peace to Liberia. Taylor considered the
E.C.O.W.A.S. intervention as a bid to thwart his ambition to take
over the Government of Liberia through the civil insurrection he
had launched in late 1989.18 Another reason advanced for Tay-
lor's involvement in the conflict in Sierra Leone was the opportu-
nity to plunder the diamond mines of Sierra Leone in order to
fund his war in Liberia. 9 While the conflict in Sierra Leone had
its internal dimensions, it is clear that there were other causes.
The conflict was also triggered by problems across its borders,
including refugee, economic, and military problems.
20
C. A War for Diamonds?
It is undeniable that the conflict in Sierra Leone is a crisis of
modernity, caused by the failed patrimonial systems of successive
post-colonial Governments. While this view has been rejected in
some quarters,2 1 it nevertheless is obvious that the State structure
has been weak, due to large-scale corruption and a lack of effi-
cient administration.22 However, these cannot be deemed to be
sufficient reasons for the scale of brutality that has accompanied
the conflict. As rightly noted by some analysts:
While there is no doubt about widespread public dis-
enchantment with the failing state, with corruption and
with a lack of opportunity, similar problems elsewhere
have not led to years of brutality by forces devoid of ideol-
ogy, political support and ethnic identity. Only the eco-
nomic opportunity presented by a breakdown in law and
order could sustain violence at the levels that have plagued
Sierra Leone since 1991.23
From the outset, it was not clear what the rebels in the
R.U.F. stood for. As they manifested no clear ideology, it was
difficult to define what the group wanted. Unlike many conflicts
18. See Stephen Ellis, Liberia's Warlord Insurgency, in Abdullah & Muana,
supra note 4, at 155, 160. See also Stephen John Stedman, Conflict and Concilia-
tion in Sub-Saharan Africa, in THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS OF INTERNAL CON-
FusT 235, 251-52 (Michael E. Brown ed., 1996).
19. See Stedman, supra note 18, at 245, 252 (noting William Reno's attri-
bution of Taylor's invasion to the need for resources). See also William Reno,
Reinvention of an African Patrimonial State: Charles Taylor's Liberia, 16 THIRD
WORLD Q. 1, 109-20 (1995).
20. See Michael E. Brown, The Causes and Regional Dimensions of Internal
Conflict, in Stedman, supra note 18, at 571, 594.
21. See Smillie, supra note 3.
22. See STOCKHOLM INT'L PEACE RESEARCH INST., SIPRI YEARBOOK 1999:
ARMAMENTS, DISARMAMENT AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY 24 [hereinafter SipRi
YEARBOOK 1999].
23. Smillie, supra note 3, at Introduction.
CONFLJCT IN SIERRA LEONE
in Africa that have roots in ethnicity, the conflict in Sierra Leone
has a distinct lack of ethnic undertones. Thus, it has been hard
explaining the conflict using the traditional paradigms. And, as
noted by Ian Smillie and others, traditional theories of political
science, economics, and military history are of little value in
explaining the conflict in Sierra Leone. As they rightly note,
"l[t] he point of the war may not actually have been to win it, but
to engage in profitable crime under the cover of warfare."24
The principal reason cited by the rebels for the conflict is
that the misrule of Sierra Leone has resulted in widespread pov-
erty. However, a closer look at the whole situation reveals that
that may not have been the only reason for the war. While the
aforementioned factors may have been the reasons for the begin-
nings of the war, the conflict certainly has assumed other dimen-
sions, which are now making it impossible for the conflict to end
and for full reconciliation to take place in the country.
The main export commodity for Sierra Leone is diamonds.
The country is rich in diamonds and the precious mineral
appears to be the main reason that the conflict is unending. The
battle is for the control of the diamond fields and the revenue
that flows from there.2" However, not much is known about the
mining and trading of Sierra Leone diamonds.26 What is known
is that some of the rebels trade in diamonds and that one of the
leading rebel commanders, Colonel Sam Bockarie (a.k.a. Maskita
or Mosquito), was an illicit diamond miner before he relocated
to Liberia and was recruited by the R.U.F.2 7 Also, the R.U.F.
recruited many of its force from youth that were engaged in illicit
diamond mining. Without any viable alternative, it would be
hard for these people to stop the illicit mining of diamonds,
which is a steady source of income for them.
I. PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT IN SIERRA LEONE
The principal protagonists in the conflict in Sierra Leone
are the Republic of Sierra Leone Military Forces and the Revolu-
tionary United Front (R.U.F./S.L.). Other Parties have also been
involved to varying degrees in various stages. These include the
Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (A.F.R.C.), the Civil
24. Id.
25. See id. See also Pratt, supra note 1, at Part II-The Security Situation:
The Diamond Connection.
26. Pratt, supra note 1, at Part II-The Security Situation: The Diamond
Connection.
27. See Abdullah & Muana, supra note 4, at 179.
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Defense Forces (of which the best known is the Kamajo2 s mili-
tia), fighters from other countries, and the regional peacekeep-
ing force Economic Community of West African States
Monitoring Group (E.C.O.M.O.G.).
A. The Republic of Sierra Leone Military Forces
The main components of the armed forces of Sierra Leone
are the army and the navy. Before the conflict began, the esti-
mated number of the army was between 3,000 and 4,000.29 By
February 1998, the figure had risen to 14,000.3o Following the
initial attack of the R.U.F. in March 1991, the army nearly
doubled from 3,000 men to almost 6,000, most of whom the
Momoh regime recruited from Freetown vagrants. 1 After the
takeover of power by young army officers in April 1992, the num-
ber of new recruits increased dramatically, particularly with the
popularity of the new regime with young people.3 2 The new
recruits into the Sierra Leone army in 1992 included many young
people; and by 1993, the number of young soldiers under fifteen
years old had reached 1,000 by some estimates. 3 The current
figures for the Sierra Leonean army and navy are estimated at
3,000 and 200, respectively.34 However, there are ongoing efforts
to increase the strength of the army to 5,000 men, following the
peace agreement signed in Lom6, Togo in 1999.
B. The Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone (R. UF./S.L.)
The R.U.F. began its war against the Government of Sierra
Leone in March 1991. It was set up by a former army corporal in
the Sierra Leone army, Alfred Foday Saybana Sankoh, who had
28. The Kamojo militia is also called Kamajors.
29. See Pratt, supra note 1, at Part I-Background: The Momoh Years:
1985-92. In 1990, the figure for active members of the armed forces of Sierra
Leone was 3,150, with 3,000 in the army and 150 in the navy. See THE INT'L
INST. FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES, THE MILITARY BALANCE 1990/1991 141-42 (1990).
30. See THE INT'L INST. FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES, THE MILITARY BALANCE
1996/1997 263 (1996); see also Lansana Fofana, Politics-Sierra Leone: What Should
A New Army Look Like?, at http://www.oneworld.org/ips2/june98/
15_41_050.html (1998).
31. See Pratt, supra note 1, at Part I-Background: The Momoh Years:
1985-92; Abdullah & Muana, supra note 4, at 180. See also THE INT'L INST. FOR
STRATEGIC STUDIES, THE MILITARY BALANCE 1994/1995 248 (1995) (estimating
the strength of the Sierra Leonean army at 6000, and the navy at 150).
32. See Pratt, supra note 1, at Part I-Background: The N.P.R.C. Regime:
1992-96.
33. See id.
34. See THE INT'L INST. FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES, THE MILITARY BALANCE
1999/2000 273 (1999) [hereinafter THE MILITARY BALANCE 1999/2000].
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formed an alliance with the Liberian warlord, Charles Taylor.
Before the R.U.F. emerged to launch its guerrilla warfare, some
of its members had undergone military training in Libya.
Among the group that went to Libya in the 1980s for training in
the art of revolution was Foday Sankoh, who had been cashiered
and jailed in 1971 for plotting a coup against Siaka Stevens."
When Sankoh arrived from Libya in 1988, along with Abu
Kanu and Rashid Mansaray, he began a recruitment drive
around the country for members for his proposed group, in
order to prepare to stage a revolution in Sierra Leone. The
three also toured Liberia in a bid to drum up support for their
cause.36 It was in 1988 that Sankoh met Taylor in Liberia, and,
thus, began an alliance that evidently still continues until today.
As a movement, the R.U.F. had some semblance of organiza-
tion. At its inception, Sankoh claimed the title "head of ideol-
ogy" and acted as spokesman for the group at various times.
The R.U.F. was organized into various units. Its "battalions" were
made up of combatants in the following categories:
1. "Vanguards": teachers of R.U.F. ideology, consisting of
guerrilla trainers, senior battle group commanders, and
junior battle front commanders;
2. Special Forces: also known as "Liberians," primarily of
Liberian origin but with family connections to Sierra
Leone (these accounted for a large number of R.U.F.
senior officers);
3. Salon wosus. rank-and-file fighters, mainly captured
recruits converted to the cause, trained, and permitted
to carry weapons;
4. "Standbys": unproven captives;
5. "Recruits": new intakes.38
A "CO" was any soldier chosen to command a mission. "Bat-
tle front commanders" led assaults on major R.U.F. targets and
were ranked Lieutenant or Captain. "Battle group commanders"
had a rank of Major or higher, coordinated and commanded bat-
tle front commanders within their sectors, and were given a voice
on the War Council.39
Although the "vanguard" and wosu groups had some female
members, the greater number of women in the R.U.F. belonged
to two groups-the Combat Support Unit and the Combat Wives
35. See Abdullah & Muana, supra note 4, at 176.
36. See id. at 177.
37. See id. at 187.
38. See id. at 188.
39. See id.
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Unit-and were mainly recruited by capture. The Combat Wives
Unit, equipped with "sista beretta" (mostly Beretta submachine
guns), policed gatherings of captive population and occasionally
performed bodyguard duties. Later, members were also involved
in "special missions," which required the women to infiltrate
"enemy territory" and travel behind enemy lines on "survival mis-
sions" to buy essential commodities and medicines.40
The Internal Defense Unit (I.D.U.) was the intelligence arm
of the R.U.F. The I.D.U. carried out reconnaissance missions,
target assessment, general military intelligence, liaisons between
commanders of battle groups and battlefronts, and liaisons with
the R.U.F. head of ideology. They monitored the movement of
civilians and R.U.F. personnel in R.U.F.-controlled enclaves and
the movement of captured civilians.4'
Even though Sankoh was 'head of ideology' of the R.U.F.,
the rebels had no clear ideology.42 According to Abdullah and
Muana, the R.U.F. has defied all available typologies of guerrilla
movements. It is neither a separatist insurgency rooted in a spe-
cific demand, as in the case of Eritrea, nor a reformist insurgency
with a radical agenda superior to the regime it sought to over-
throw. It is a movement without any significant national follow-
ing or ethnic support.43 Until about 1995, it was unclear what
the R.U.F. and Foday Sankoh wanted. Although the BBC had
occasionally done radio-telephone interviews of Sankoh, no
cohesive ideology was expressed until 1995, when Footpaths to
Democracy: Toward a New Sierra Leone, an R.U.F. propaganda pam-
phlet, appeared." The pamphlet, which has been described as
"a pathetic and well-worn criticism of the APC regime," was alleg-
edly taken from work done by some of the expelled students in
Ghana.45
There are varying figures for the strength of the R.U.F.
Some estimate that the number is between 8,000, and 10,000
soldiers.46 However, until 1998, the number was around 3,000 to
5,000.
4 7
40. See id. at 189.
41. See id.
42. See supra INTRODUCTION.
43. See Abdullah & Muana, supra note 4, at 190.
44. See Pratt, supra note 1, at Part I-Background: The N.P.R.C. Regime:
1992-96.
45. Abdullah & Muana, supra note 4, at 192.
46. See THE COALITION TO STOP THE USE OF CHILD SOLDIERS, AFRICA
REPORT: SIERRA LEONE, at http://www.child-soldiers.org (last visited Mar. 7,
2001).
47. See THE INT'L INST. FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES, THE MILITARY BALANCE
1997/1998 257 (1997) [hereinafter THE MILITARY BALANCE 1997/1998]; see also
CONFLICT IN SIERRA LEONE
C. The Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (A.F.R.C.)
On May 25, 1997, the elected Government of President
Tejan Kabbah was toppled in a military coup.4" Junior officers of
the Sierra Leone Armed Forces seized power and freed Major
Johnny Paul Koroma, who at the time was in prison awaiting trial
for conspiracy to overthrow the Government of Kabbah in Sep-
tember 1996. Koroma was immediately named Chairman of the
new A.F.R.C., and one of his first acts on assuming power was to
ban all political Parties and all public demonstrations and meet-
ings. He also invited the R.U.F. to join the A.F.R.C. in ruling the
country and declared the civil war to be over.49 The R.U.F.
accepted the offer and became a powerful part of the Govern-
ment; Foday Sankoh was named Vice-Chairman of the A.F.R.C.
At that time, Sankoh was still under house arrest in Nigeria on
charges of possession of arms and ammunition,5 ° even though he
had gone to Nigeria for peacemaking purposes.51
The A.F.R.C. joined forces with the R.U.F. to form the Peo-
ple's Army. Large numbers of R.U.F. forces arrived in Freetown.
A complete breakdown of law and order followed as the two
forces combined to commit various acts of violence against inno-
STOCKHOLM INT'L PEACE RESEARCH INST., SIPRI YEARBOOK 1998: ARMAMENTS, Dis-
ARMAMENT AND INTERNATIONAL SECuRIrrY 29.
48. According to UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, "the chance to plun-
der natural resources and loot Central Bank reserves was a key motivation of
those who seized power from the elected Government in May 1997." See The
Causes of Conflict and the Promotion of Durable Peace and Sustainable Development in
Africa, Report by the Secretary-General, U.N. SCOR, 52d Sess., U.N. Doc. S/1998/
318 (1998).
49. See Pratt, supra note 1, at Part I-Background: The Period After 1996.
50. See AMNESTY INT'L, SIERRA LEONE: A DIsAsTRous SET-BACK FOR HuMAN
RIGHTS, at http://web.amnesty.org/ai.nsf/Index/AFR510051997 (Oct. 29,
1997).
51. Some reports suggested that he was lured to Nigeria so that the peace
process in Sierra Leone could go ahead without him. However, it appears that
he went on his own volition to Nigeria, without contacting his Ivorian hosts to
guarantee his security and without informing the Nigerian authorities. Sankoh
was a personal friend of then Nigerian Head of State, Sani Abacha, and that fact
seems to be the only plausible reason he would dare to undertake such a trip
without prior warning or protocol. He wanted to persuade Abacha to use his
office to find a solution to the conflict in Sierra Leone. But earlier in February,
1997, the O.A.U. Foreign Ministers decided to remove Sankoh from the scene
because he had been frustrating the peace process. The Nigerian Foreign Min-
ister had agreed to lure him to Nigeria, but at the time he went he had not
been invited. His arrival was an opportunity for the Nigerians to perfect the
decision made in February, even though the Nigerians were confused as to how
to deal with him. The Sierra Leonean Government wanted Nigeria to turn him
over so he could be prosecuted for war crimes, but Nigeria did not. See Alan
Rake, The Sankoh Affair, NEw AFRICAN, June 1997, at 12-13.
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cent citizens, supporters of Kabbah, and other opponents of the
regime.
Following the E.C.O.M.O.G. intervention in 1998,52 Presi-
dent Kabbah was restored to power. The A.F.R.C./R.U.F. coali-
tion retreated and began an offensive against the Government of
Sierra Leone and the E.C.O.M.O.G. forces; at this stage, it
became hard to distinguish between the A.F.R.C. and the R.U.F.
The A.F.R.C. had a considerable number of combatants, num-
bering around 8,000 to 10,000 in 1997."3 The current combined
strength of the A.F.R.C./R.U.F. is estimated at about 15,000.54
D. Civil Defense Forces (C.D.F.) / Kamajo Militia
After the R.U.F. emerged from obscurity in 1991, there was
some resentment from the local populace. The R.U.F. could not
gain acceptance within some communities despite the alienation
of those communities from the Government. 55 Whatever poten-
tial goodwill the R.U.F. could have enjoyed was stifled by looting
and indiscriminate violence by the Liberian "special forces," an
integral part of the original invading force. Instead of condemn-
ing those acts, Foday Sankoh justified them as a reward. There-
fore, it was easy for the civilian populace to detest the R.U.F.5 6
The above, coupled with the inability of the armed forces of
Sierra Leone to protect the entire territory of the country, led
citizens in some areas of the country to organize themselves into
civil defense units to fight the incursions of the R.U.F. Civil
defense forces began appearing around the country and the pop-
ular Kamajo militia5 7 was the strongest of the C.D.F.s; other
C.D.F. include the Temne Kapras and the Koranko Tamaboros.5 8
The Kamajo forces were comprised of local youths sup-
ported by the local population, whose shared knowledge of local
bush tracks and ambush points was usually superior to the
enemy's.5 9 The mass mobilization of this group began in 1993-
94 with the formation of the Eastern Region Defense Committee,
52. See infra Parts I.E., 1V.B.
53. See THE MILITARY BALANCE 1997/1998, supra note 47, at 257.
54. See SIPm YEARBOOK 1999, supra note 22, at 32.
55. See Abdullah & Muana, supra note 4, at 180.
56. See id.
57. See id.
58. See DEP'T OF STATE, 105th CONG., COUNTRY REPORTS ON HuMAN
RIGHTS AND PRACrCES FOR 1997 298 (Joint Comm. Print 1998) [hereinafter
SIERRA LEONE CoUNTRY REPORT 1997].
59. See Abdullah & Muana, supra note 4, at 185.
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and continued to 1996, when regent chief Captain Hinga Nor-
man was appointed Deputy Minister of Defense.6 °
In some parts of the country, attempts were made by the
local populace to occupy the communities hitherto abandoned
to the R.U.F. Some localities, accompanied by Kamajo militia,
began to resettle their chiefdoms. Young people were nomi-
nated and sponsored for Kamajo training and initiation. Units
were organized in such a way that combatants were posted only
to their chiefdoms in order to ensure loyalty, discipline, and a
"bush knowledge" superior to that of the R.U.F. Additionally,
the revered and esoteric Mende cult of invincible and heroic
hunters was revived as a communal militia, chosen from, trained
within, and responsible to the people. The Kamajo militia, how-
ever, was only lightly armed with shotguns, knives, and the occa-
sional captured AK47. But they were armed with social and
technical combat skills, with which the units began to counter-
attack R.U.F. groups moving over bush paths to carry out raids or
secure supplies. Thus, they began to limit the freedom of the
R.U.F. to organize and exchange supplies.
61
As with the other forces involved in the conflict, there are
differing figures for the combatants in the Kamajo militia. The
1997 estimate was 17,000,62 while the figure for 1998 was around
30,000.6' Another estimate puts the size of the Kamajo militia as
between 20,000 and 37,000.64
E. E. C. O.WA.S. Monitoring Group (E. C. O.M. O. G.)
The Economic Community of West African States
(E.C.O.W.A.S.) created a cease-fire monitoring group in 1990, in
response to the Liberian civil war. The purpose was to halt the
"wanton destruction of human life and property ... [and] ...
massive damage . . .being caused by the armed conflict to the
stability of the entire Liberian nation."65 It was in the course of
E.C.O.W.A.S. operations in Liberia that the conflict in Sierra
60. See id.
61. See id. at 185-86.
62. See THE MILITARY BALANCE 1997/1998, supra note 47, at 257.
63. See SIPRI YEARBOOK 1999, supra note 22, at 32 (listing the Kamajo mili-
tia as the Government forces).
64. UNITED BRETHREN CHURCH MISSIONARIES IN FREETOWN, CHRONOLOGY
OF THE EVACUATION OF SIERRA LEONE, at http://www.realworldrescue.com/
chronolo.htm (last visited Feb. 15, 2001).
65. E.C.O.W.A.S. Standing Mediation Committee, Decision A/DEC.I/8/
90, on the Cease-fire and Establishment of an E.C.O.W.A.S. Cease-fire Monitor-
ing Group for Liberia, Banjul, Republic of Gambia (Aug. 7, 1990), reprinted in 6
REGIONAL PEAcE-KEEPING AND INTERNATIONAL ENFORCEMENT: THE LIBERIAN CRI-
SIS 67 (M. Weller ed., 1994). See Jeremy Levitt, Humanitarian Intervention by
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Leone began and the group soon became involved in the conflict
in Sierra Leone.
Following the military coup of May 25, 1997, deposed Presi-
dent Tejan Kabbah officially requested that Nigeria and
E.C.O.W.A.S. intervene and restore him to power.66 Pursuant to
its obligation under a Status of Forces Agreement (S.O.F.A.), the
Nigerian Government sent extra forces to Sierra Leone not long
after the coup in order to restore law and order.6 7 These addi-
tional forces joined the Nigerian Forces Assistant Group
(N.I.F.A.G.), already on the ground in Sierra Leone. There were
also E.C.O.M.O.G. forces in Sierra Leone; they had used the
country as a base in their peacekeeping efforts in Liberia.
N.I.F.A.G. and E.C.O.M.O.G. forces had been the subjects of a
preemptive strike by the A.F.R.C. during the coup.6 8
The A.F.R.C./R.U.F. forces strongly resisted the N.I.F.A.G.
forces, which were forced to retreat. On August 30, 1997,
E.C.O.W.A.S. officially mandated E.C.O.M.O.G. to enforce sanc-
tions against the Government of A.F.R.C./R.U.F. and to restore
law and order in Sierra Leone.69 In support of this action, the
UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1132 on October 8,
1997.70 The resolution imposed an arms and petroleum
embargo and travel restrictions against the military junta.71
Thus began the involvement of E.C.O.M.O.G. in the conflict
in Sierra Leone. It should be noted that after the coup, the
N.I.F.A.G. and E.C.O.M.O.G. contingents merged their opera-
tions. On February 5, 1998, E.C.O.M.O.G. launched a military
attack on the A.F.R.C./R.U.F. forces, claiming it was responding
to an attack by those forces. This action of E.C.O.M.O.G. led to
Regional Actors in Internal Conflicts: The Case of E. C.. WA.S. in Liberia and Sierra
Leone, 12 TEMP. INT'L & CoMP. L.J. 333, 343 (1998).
66. See Sierra Leone: Military Coup, 1997 AFRICA RESEARCH BULLETIN 12695
(June 1997) [hereinafter Military Coup]; Kabbah Urges E.C.O.W.A.S. Leaders to
Restore Him to Power, PANAmICAN NEws AGENCY, Sept. 2, 1997. See also Levitt,
supra note 65, at 365.
67. See Levitt, supra note 65, at 366 (citing Military Coup, supra note 66, at
12734).
68. See E.C.O. WA.S. Intervenes to Restore Democracy, AFRICA TODAY, July/
Aug. 1997, at 24; Levitt, supra note 65, at 365.
69. See Paul Ejime, Tougher Measures Against Junta in Freetown, PANAmcAN
NEws AGENCY, Aug. 31, 1997. See Levitt, supra note 65, at 366. Levitt notes that
in early August 1997, pursuant to requests by E.C.O.W.A.S. Member States, for-
mer Nigerian Head of State and E.C.O.W.A.S. Chairman General Sani Abacha
appears to have issued an "executive directive" authorizing an economic block-
ade against Sierra Leone to be enforced by E.C.O.M.O.G. Id. at 366 n.183.
70. U.N. SCOR, 52d Sess., 3822d mtg., Res. 1132 at U.N. Doc. S/RES/
1132 (1997).
71. See Levitt, supra note 65, at 366.
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the removal from power of the A.F.R.C./R.U.F. Government on
February 12, 1998. On March 10, 1998, President Kabbah
returned to Freetown to resume his position as Head of State of
Sierra Leone.
7 2
E.C.O.M.O.G. has been in Sierra Leone since and is now
part of the efforts of the UN to restore peace to Sierra Leone.
The number of E.C.O.M.O.G. forces at the end of 1999 stood
between 10,000 and 15,000. 7" Most of those forces have since
been withdrawn and replaced by UN forces.
F. Other Groups
At different stages of the armed conflict in Sierra Leone,
other actors featured prominently. One of these was Executive
Outcomes (E.O.), a private security group from South Africa. As
the R.U.F. rebellion spread and the rebels threatened Freetown,
the N.P.R.C. Government under Valentine Strasser in May 1995
turned to E.O., which already had a record of successfully repel-
ling U.N.I.T.A. rebels on behalf of the Angolan Government."
In May 1995, the first E.O. contingent came to Sierra Leone.
They drove the R.U.F. out of Freetown within ten days of their
operational start-up; within one month, the diamond areas were
cleared of rebels.7 5 E.O. operated with limited combat person-
nel, but they had the necessary combat skills, as well as excellent
air support, first-rate communications equipment, and good
trainers. With these resources, they helped track down R.U.F.
rebels, and by early 1996, the R.U.F. had been seriously damaged
and driven away from the diamond mining areas.76
However, following the peace agreement signed at the end
of November 1996, between President Kabbah and R.U.F. leader
Sankoh, E.O. was expelled from Sierra Leone. At the peace
talks, the R.U.F. had demanded the withdrawal of E.O., and the
agreement stipulated that E.O. would withdraw from the country
within five weeks of signing the peace agreement.7 7 While E.O.
was still in Sierra Leone, it had helped train the Kamajo militia,
in addition to combating the rebels. When the E.O. was
expelled, another security firm, Life Guard (an offshoot of E.O.)
72. See id.
73. See SliPu YEARBOOK 1999, supra note 22, at 32. Other sources show this
number to be as low as 1500-2500. See THE MILrrARY BALANCE 1999/2000, supra
note 34, at 273.
74. See Pratt, supra note 1, at Part I-Background: The N.P.R.C. Regime:
1992-96.
75. Id.
76. Id. See also Abdullah & Muana, supra note 4, at 185.
77. Pratt, supra note 1, at Part I-Background: The Period After 1996.
2001]
406 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 15
remained behind to protect the diamond mining areas and train
the Kamajo militia."
E.O. had a definitive assignment, to assist in combating the
rebels in Sierra Leone; such was not the case with Life Guard.
The latter remained behind to provide security for the mining
areas, even though it was involved in training the Kamajo militia.
The involvement of private security companies in internal con-
flicts and the full implications of the phenomenon under inter-
national humanitarian law are a subject of unending debate.79
Another significant part of the conflict in Sierra Leone is the
involvement of foreign forces. As noted earlier, forces from
Liberia have been part of the conflict from the beginning.8"
However, Liberian President Taylor denies any official Liberian
military involvement in Sierra Leone, describing his countrymen
in Sierra Leone as mercenaries.81 Despite this denial, the assis-
tance of Taylor's N.P.F.L. and the later Liberian Government to
the R.U.F. is said to be well-documented and has included train-
ing, personnel, and considerable logistical support.82
There is also evidence of military involvement by Burkina
Faso on behalf of the R.U.F. Both the Government of Sierra
Leone and E.C.O.M.O.G. claim that mercenaries from Ukraine
78. Sierra Leone: Mining Policy Needed, 1998 AFRICAN RESEARCH BULLETIN
13446, 13446 (June 1998).
79. See e.g., Juan Carlos Zarate, The Emergence of a New Dog of War: Private
International Security Companies, International Law, and the New World Disorder, 34
STAN. J. INT'L L. 75 (1998); Herbert M. Howe, The Privatization of International
Affairs: Global Order and the Privatization of Security, 22 FLETCHER F. WORLD Arr. 1
(1998); LESLIE C. GREEN, The Status of Mercenaries in International Law, in ESSAYS
ON THE MODERN LAW OF WAR, ch. XV (1999).
80. See generally Pratt, supra note 1.
81. SIPRI YEARBOOK 1999, supra note 22, at 24.
82. HUMAN RTS. WATCH, SIERRA LEONE: GETTING AWAY WITH MURDER,
MUTILATION AND RAPE, 11 NEW REPORT FROM THE FIELD 3A, at http://
www.hrw.org/hrw/reports/1999/sierra/SIERLE99-02.htm (June 1999) [here-
inafter GETTING AWAY WITH MURDER]. See also AMNESTY INT'L, SIERRA LEONE
1998-A YEAR OF ATROCTIES AGAINST CIVILIANs, available at http://
www.web.amnesty.org/ai.nsf/index/AFR510221998 (last visited Feb. 15, 2001)
[hereinafter A YEAR OF ATROCrEs AGAINST CIVILIANS]. This report notes the
involvement of Liberian forces and some reported contact with the R.U.F. sec-
ond-in-command, Sam Bockarie. It also notes a statement by the U.S. Depart-
ment of State, on May 12, 1998, referring to:
[D]istressing rumors that R.U.F. and A.F.R.C. forces were being
assisted in their campaign of terror by other governments. Although
we cannot confirm these rumors, it should be clear that any govern-
ment or other party that is found to be helping the rebels to prolong
the tragedy in Sierra Leone will face the strongest condemnation of
the United States and the international community.
CONFLICT IN SIERRA LEONE
are also involved in the training of rebel forces. According to
one report, events and evidence available indicate that small
arms were coming from Eastern Europe (either Bulgaria or
Ukraine) through Libya, Burkina Faso, and Liberia for delivery
to the rebels just across the Liberia-Sierra Leone border.8 3 How-
ever, according to the same report, Libyan involvement seems to
be more as a conduit, as opposed to a source of small arms.84
Though Sankoh was trained in Libya as Charles Taylor was, given
the fact that this was a ready source of income, it was unlikely
that Libya was providing the services for free.85
Ukrainian arms and ammunition suppliers became involved
under the N.P.R.C., and this involvement increased under the
regime of Brigadier Maada Bio. During the January 1999 offen-
sive, armed, white men fought next to and commanded members
of the R.U.F. In April 1999, the E.C.O.M.O.G. Force Com-
mander publicly accused the Presidents of Burkina Faso and
Liberia of using Ukrainian registered aircraft and crews to supply
the R.U.F. The Government of Sierra Leone also enlisted several
foreign soldiers and pilots to fly, man, and maintain the
E.C.O.M.O.G. attack helicopters.8 6
All these outside forces have only served to complicate the
conflict. Since they have no interest in the internal politics of
Sierra Leone, the only plausible reason for their involvement is
the availability of mineral resources, which are being exploited
without any income accruing to Sierra Leone itself. Proceeds
from the sale of diamonds mined by the rebels support the oper-
ations of the rebels.8 7 As noted by the Stockholm International
Peace Research Institute:
The combination of weak states and rich natural resources
has resulted in a dangerous structural environment fuel-
ling conflicts throughout [Sub-Saharan Africa]. Natural
resources have become a cause for war as well as a neces-
sary source of wealth for keeping the conflict going. The
83. Pratt, supra note 1, at Part II-The Security Situation: Trafficking in
Small Arms. At some point, the arms shipments were in violation of the provi-
sions of a UN Security Council resolution (U.N. Security Council Res. 1132
(Oct. 8, 1997)), which called on all Member States to observe an arms embargo
on Sierra Leone. See A YEAR OF ATRoCITIES AGAINST CWIL1ANs, supra note 82.
84. Pratt, supra note 1, at Part II-The Security Situation: Trafficking in
Small Arms.
85. Id.
86. GETrING AWAY WITH MURDER, supra note 82.
87. Id. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Insti-
tute, "[i]n Sierra Leone control of the diamond mines is a key to power and
wealth. Liberian soldiers in Sierra Leone, fighting alongside the R.U.F./
A.F.R.C., are paid in diamonds." SIPRI YEARBOOK 1999, supra note 22, at 25.
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main actors in the struggle for Africa's natural resources
. are now primarily African, although foreign companies
play a role. In several parts of Sub-Saharan Africa semi-
political actors are fighting for the control of natural
resources without any wider political ambition.
88
This succinctly captures the situation in Sierra Leone and rein-
forces the view that diamonds motivate the conflict more than
misrule, which has been a feature of Sierra Leone since
independence.89
II. CHARACTERIZATION OF THE CONFLICT IN SIERRA LEONE
It is necessary to attempt to classify the Sierra Leone conflict
in order to determine the liability of the various actors. Gener-
ally, armed conflicts can be international or non-international
armed conflicts, but they also can be a mix of the two. There are
lesser situations of internal disturbances, tensions, and riots,
which may not rise to the level of an armed conflict so as to trig-
ger the provisions of international humanitarian law applicable
to armed conflicts. These latter situations are governed by the
general provisions of human rights law.
It is necessary to determine whether the conflict in Sierra
Leone falls into any of these categories. Characterization will
determine which rules of international humanitarian law, if any,
are applicable to the conflict. Classification as international
armed conflict means that the whole weight of the laws of war
will apply to the conflict. If the conflict is a non-international
armed conflict, the rules of international humanitarian law con-
tained in Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and in
Protocol II9 may be applicable, depending on the intensity of
the conflict and whether or not the State is a party to Protocol II.
However, it becomes a matter of debate whether all the provi-
sions of the laws of war or international humanitarian law will be
applicable. If the conflict is classified as a mixed conflict, the
applicable legal regime is also not certain; the law is still develop-
ing in this respect.
88. SiPRI YEARBOOK 1999, supra note 22, at 25.
89. See Opala, supra note 1, at "Sierra Leone After Independence (1961-
1992)."
90. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949,
and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts
(Protocol II), June 8, 1977, opened for signature Dec. 12, 1977, U.N. Doc. A/32/
144, Annex I, 11 (1977), reprinted in 16 I.L.M. 1442 (1977) [hereinafter Protocol
II].
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Certainly, the conflict in Sierra Leone, as seen in the previ-
ous chapter, is an armed conflict and not an internal disturbance
because the Parties are organized under a single command and
are capable of sustaining military operations over a certain
period. This is true despite the fact that, at some point, it
appeared as if the whole rebellion was fizzling out. The multi-
plicity of actors and the interests at stake ensure that it is not a
mere disturbance or tension, which would deny the applicability
of the rules of international humanitarian law in one form or
another.
A. Wat is an "armed conflict"?
This term is an expression, which covers armed confronta-
tions between:
1. two or more States;
2. a State and a body other than a State;
3. a State and a dissident faction; and,
4. two ethnic factions within a State.9 1
In The Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu,92 the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (I.C.T.R.) tried to define armed
conflict. The court referred to the decision of the Appeals
Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia (I.C.T.Y.), in The Prosecutor v. Tadic,9" wherein that Tri-
bunal held that an armed conflict exists:
[W]henever there is . . . protracted armed violence
between governmental authorities and organized armed
groups or between such groups within a State. Interna-
tional humanitarian law applies from the initiation of such
armed conflicts and extends beyond the cessation of hostil-
91. PIETRO VIERI, DICTIONARY OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF ARMED CON-
F cT 34 (Edward Markee & Susan Mutti trans., Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross
1992). This conceivably should include religious and other factions within a
State. See also H. VICTOR CoNDt, A HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS TERMINOLOGY (1999), where the term "armed conflict" is defined as
"hostile military engagement between two or more States that may or may not
constitute a state of war, or a civil war characterized by hostilities between the
State and an opposing faction or between opposing factions."
92. No. ICTR.96-4-T (I.C.T.R. Sept. 2, 1998), reprinted in How DOES LAw
PROTECT IN WAR: CASES, DOCUMENTS, AND TEACHING MATERIALS ON CONTEMPO-
RARY PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL HuMANrTARAN LAw 1325 (Marco Sassoli &
Antoine A. Bouvier eds., Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross 1999) [hereinafter How
DoES LAw PROTECT IN WAR].
93. No. IT-94-1AR72 (I.C.T.Y. Oct. 2, 1995) (appeal on jurisdiction), 35
I.L.M. 32 (1996) [hereinafter Tadic Appeal], reprinted in How DOES LAw PRo-
TECT IN WAR, supra note 92, at 1159.
20011
410 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 15
ities until . . . in the case of internal conflicts, a peaceful
settlement is achieved.9 4
According to the Rwandan Tribunal, the term "armed conflict"
in itself suggests the existence of hostilities between armed forces
organized to a greater or lesser extent.9 5 The definitions prof-
fered by the two international tribunals give some clarity to the
definition of "armed conflict."
B. International Armed Conflict
For a conflict to be termed "international armed conflict," it
essentially has to be between two sovereign States. International
armed conflict includes:
(1) the use of force in a warlike manner between States,
whether or not they recognize themselves being at war; (2)
all "measures short of war" whether or not they are com-
patible with Article 2(4) of the UN Charter; and, (3) wars
of national liberation as set out in Article 1(4) of the 1977
Protocol I Additional to the Four Geneva Conventions of
1949.96
When there is an exchange of hostilities between two or
more States, international law considers this sufficient to trigger
international humanitarian law. Therefore, when Parties to a
conflict commit atrocities, their actions are measured by the
rules of international humanitarian law, primarily the Four
Geneva Conventions of 1949.17 There are also additional proto-
cols to the conventions,9" principally Protocol I.
94. Tadic Appeal, supra note 93, at 54.
95. Id.
96. Karl Josef Partsch, Armed Conflict, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNA-
TIONAL LAw 251 (Bernhardt ed. 1992) [hereinafter ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW].
97. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114
[hereinafter First Geneva Convention]; Geneva Convention for the Ameliora-
tion of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of
Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217 [hereinafter Second
Geneva Convention]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prison-
ers of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316 [Third Geneva Convention]; Geneva
Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug.
12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516 [hereinafter Fourth Geneva Convention] [hereinafter
collectively referred to as 1949 Geneva Conventions].
98. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949,
and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts
(Protocol I),June 8,1977, opened for signature Dec. 12, 1977, U.N. Doc. A/32/
144, Annex I, I (1977), reprinted in 16 I.L.M. 1391 (1977) [hereinafter Protocol
I]; Protocol II, supra note 90.
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Under the Geneva Conventions, it would be difficult to char-
acterize the conflict in Sierra Leone as an international armed
conflict. The principal actors are Sierra Leoneans, even though
there are other nationalities involved. There is no State formally
at war with Sierra Leone, though the acts of some Liberians and
alleged combatants from other countries, fighting on behalf of
the rebels, would constitute a hostile act against the State of
Sierra Leone. Even then, it would still be difficult to characterize
the conflict as international armed conflict in the classic sense.
There is insufficient proof that the Liberians fighting in Sierra
Leone are under the command of the Liberian armed forces. If
it were otherwise, and the participation of Liberians in the con-
flict could be proved as part of a plan by the Liberian armed
forces, the conflict in Sierra Leone would be an international
armed conflict.
C. Non-international Armed Conflict
This type of conflict involves the armed forces of a State and
other forces within the same State, including those who fight lib-
eration wars and rebels in different causes, but does not extend
to situations of internal disturbances or tensions. Non-interna-
tional armed conflicts are governed principally by Common Arti-
cle 3 to the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the provisions of
Protocol II.
Defining a non-international armed conflict or internal
armed conflict has always been a difficult issue.99 Common Arti-
cle 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions refers to an "armed con-
flict not of an international character occurring in the territory
of one of the High Contracting Parties."10 ° This article defines
the armed conflicts by stating what they are not; it does not enu-
merate any substantive or procedural criteria for their identifica-
99. HiLAiRE MCCOUBREY, INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW: THE REGU-
LATION OF ARMED CONFLICTS 171 (1990). Cf Cond6, supra note 91, at 71 (defin-
ing "internal armed conflict" as "[a]n armed conflict that takes place solely
within one State and between Parties from that State, whether between the gov-
ernment and a faction or between factions").
100. 1949 Geneva Conventions, supra note 97. See also The Convention
for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, Art.
19(1) (1954) (referring to "armed conflict not of an international character")
(final act of the Intergovernmental Conference on the Protection of Cultural
Property in the Event of Armed Conflict (with attached resolutions)); Conven-
tion for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict,
Protocol for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict,
May 14, 1954, 249 U.N.T.S. 215-387.
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tion.1 1 Without a substantive definition, the threshold issues
become: What are the minimum required elements of an
"armed conflict not of an international character?" What distin-
guishes such conflict from other forms of violence and civil dis-
ruption that do not meet that threshold?1"'
Protocol II elaborates on the provisions of international law
applicable to non-international armed conflicts. The material
field of application of the Protocol is defined as:
All armed conflicts ... not covered by Article 1 of [Proto-
col I] ... which take place in the territory of a High Con-
tracting Party between its armed forces and dissident
armed forces or other organized armed groups which,
under responsible command, exercise such control over a
part of its territory as to enable them to carry out sustained
and concerted military operations and to implement [Pro-
tocol II] .105
While this provision appears to expand on Common Article 3, it
has difficulties. It adds many restrictions that were not in the
original draft submitted by the International Committee of the
Red Cross (I.C.R.C.) to the 1974-1977 Diplomatic Conference.
The I.C.R.C. draft provided a positive definition of non-interna-
tional armed conflict, but the final version added other require-
ments that complicated the issues. Article 1 (1) of the I.C.R.C.
draft Protocol II provided, "The present Protocol shall apply to
all armed conflicts not covered by Article 2 common to the
Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949 taking place between
armed forces or other organized armed groups under responsi-
ble command."1" 4
Additionally, Protocol II now requires territorial control by
the rebels substantial enough to "enable them to carry out sus-
tained and concerted military operations." This may not only
require a high intensity armed conflict but may imply that the
territorial control should be such as to allow the rebels to resort
to conventional warfare, though according to Georges Abi-Saab
such a construction would be exaggerated.'0 5
However, there has not been similar difficulty in defining a
civil war, which is closely related to internal armed conflicts.
101. Georges Abi-Saab, Non-International Armed Conflict, in INTERNATIONAL
DIMENSIONS OF INTERNATIONAL HuMANITARIAN LAw 222 (Henry Dunant Inst. &
UNESCO eds., 1988).
102. Id.
103. Protocol II, supra note 90, art. 1(1).
104. Abi-Saab, supra note 101, at 227.
105. See id.
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Hans Kelsen defines a civil war in very simple terms as "the fight
of a revolutionary group against the legitimate government. '10 6
According to Michael B. Akehurst:
[A] civil war is a war between two or more groups of inhab-
itants of the same State. A civil war may be fought for the
control of the government of a State, or it may be caused
by the desire of part of the populace to secede and form a
new State. These two types of civil war are the most com-
mon, but there can also be other types of civil war; for
instance, the rebels may try to force the government to
make concessions (e.g. the granting of regional autonomy)
without trying either to overthrow the government or to
form a new State. It is even possible for a civil war to be
fought between factions while the government remains
neutral and impotent (e.g. the Lebanese civil war of 1975-
1976, or the hostilities between the Smith regime and the
Patriotic Front in Rhodesia between 1972 and 1979, at a
time when Rhodesia was legally still a British colony).107
The conflict in Sierra Leone apparently satisfies the defini-
tion of a non-international conflict in the Geneva Conventions.
The conflict involves the armed forces of Sierra Leone and the
rebel movement R.U.F. As noted earlier, the conflict definitely
rises above mere internal tensions and disturbances and satisfies
the requirements of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conven-
tions. It is an armed conflict "not of an international charac-
ter, " "' and it goes even further, satisfying the strict requirements
of Protocol II as well.
109
D. Internationalized (Internal) Armed Conflicts
An internationalized internal armed conflict is a civil war in
which the armed forces of a foreign power intervene.110 How-
106. HANS KELSEN, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 28 (2d ed. 1966)
(1952).
107. Michael B. Akehurst, Civil War, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNA-
TiONAL LAw, supra note 96, at 597.
108. 1949 Geneva Conventions, supra note 97, art. 3.
109. See infra Part III.B.
110. Hans-Peter Gasser, Internationalized Non-International Armed Conflicts:
Case Studies of Afghanistan, Kampuchea, and Lebanon, 33 AM. U.L. Riv. 145, 145
(1983). See CONDt, supra note 91, at 73 (defining "internationalized armed con-
flict" as:
An armed conflict occurring within only one state but when either the
state or an armed opposition group has brought in an outside state for
help or an outside state has voluntarily/unilaterally intervened on one
party's behalf. Also said of an armed conflict -governed by the 1977
Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions, as to noninternational armed
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ever, this definition is not exhaustive. According to Pietro Vierri,
a non-international armed conflict may become international-
ized if:
[A] State victim of an insurrection identifies the insurgents
as belligerents; (2) one or more foreign States assist one of
the parties with their own armed forces; [or], (3) the
armed forces of two foreign States intervene, each in aid of
a different party.111
It should be noted that an internationalized internal armed
conflict lacks specific international provisions, unlike the two dis-
tinct categories of international and non-international armed
conflicts.' 12 But it is a type of conflict that occurs with increasing
frequency in the world today.
The conflict in Sierra Leone also comes close to being
regarded as a mixed conflict. While it has strictly internal ele-
ments, it certainly has external dimensions, as seen in the
involvement of troops from Liberia and Burkina Faso. The
involvement of E.C.O.M.O.G. troops adds another dimension to
the conflict. E.C.O.M.O.G., as an organ of the sub-regional body
E.C.O.W.A.S., fought on the side of the elected Government of
President Kabbah, particularly when he requested the assistance
of the sub-regional body E.C.O.W.A.S. to reinstate him after
being overthrown in a coup. Even if the Liberian connection
were ignored, the involvement of E.C.O.W.A.S. after 1997 makes
it difficult to characterize the conflict as a purely internal armed
conflict.
Many conflict situations in the world today contain interna-
tional and noninternational aspects. At present there is no
agreed upon mechanism for definitively characterizing situations
of violence.11 Even so, in light of the intervention by various
actors, the conflict in Sierra Leone is easily characterized as a
mixed case of international and noninternational armed conflict.
III. RuLEs OF INTERNATIONAL HuMANITARIAN LAw APPLICABLE
TO THE CONFLICT IN SIERRA LEONE
How international humanitarian law should be applied to
the conflict in Sierra Leone is a matter of debate. Some analysts
conflicts wherein a people is fighting alien occupation, colonial domi-
nation, or apartheid in a struggle to achieve self-determination. These
are considered 'internationalized' armed conflicts, which would other-
wise only be noninternational).
111. VIERI, supra note 91, at 35.
112. See id.
113. Theodor Meron, The Humanization of Humanitarian Law, 94 AM. J.
INT'L. L. 239, 261 (2000).
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would contend that all of this law should apply, even though the
conflict is at best, a mixed conflict." 4 As Theodor Meron notes,
there is an effort to blur the distinction between international
and non-international armed conflicts, and the effect is to make
all of international humanitarian law applicable to all conflicts,
irrespective of their characterization. 15 Meron notes further the
finding of the I.C.T.Y. that the distinction between international
and non-international armed conflicts was "losing its value" in
relation to human beings. The Tribunal said:
[W]hy protect civilians from belligerent violence, or ban
rape, torture or the wanton destruction of hospitals,
churches, museums or private property, as well as pro-
scribe weapons causing unnecessary suffering when two
sovereign States are engaged in war, and yet refrain from
enacting the same bans or providing the same protection
when armed violence has erupted "only" within the terri-
tory of a sovereign State? If international law, while of
course duly safeguarding the legitimate interests of States,
must gradually turn to the protection of human beings, it
is only natural that the aforementioned dichotomy should
gradually lose its weight.
16
While there has been some relative progress toward collaps-
ing the difference between international and non-international
armed conflicts, others argue that there should still be some cau-
tion in seeking to apply the whole of international humanitarian
law to internal armed conflicts and mixed conflicts. The interna-
tional humanitarian law relating to internal armed conflicts is
still not developed to the extent that it would apply to this cate-
gory of conflict. In the case of Sierra Leone, some parts of inter-
national humanitarian law would apply. The parts for
consideration are Common Article 3 to the 1949 Geneva Con-
ventions, Protocol II Additional to the Four Geneva Conventions,
and the whole of international humanitarian law subject to a spe-
cial agreement between the Parties.
Whatever the level of development in the rules, one can
safely posit that in this conflict, the norms of international
humanitarian law designed to protect civilians should be applica-
ble. In human rights and international humanitarian law, civil-
ians should have the benefit of the law that gives them the
greatest protection. This would not be the case for combatant
114. Id.
115. See id. at 261-62.
116. Tadic Appeal, supra note 93, at 63; Meron, supra note 113, at 262.
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privilege since that solely applies to international armed
conflicts.
A. Article 3 Common to the 1949 Geneva Conventions
Common Article 3 is usually considered as a "Convention
within the Conventions" and a "Convention in miniature."'1 7 It
provides that:
In the case of armed conflict not of an international char-
acter occurring in the territory of one of the High Con-
tracting Parties, each Party to the conflict shall be bound to
apply, as a minimum, the following provisions:
(1) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, includ-
ing members of armed forces who have laid down
their arms and those placed 'hors de combat' by sickness,
wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all cir-
cumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse
distinction founded on race, colour [sic], religion or
faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria.
To this end, the following acts are and shall remain
prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever
with respect to the above-mentioned persons:
(a) violence to life and person, in particular murder
of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and tor-
ture; (b) taking of hostages; (c) outrages upon
personal dignity, in particular humiliating and
degrading treatment; (d) the passing of sentences
and the carrying out of executions without previ-
ous judgment pronounced by a regularly consti-
tuted court, affording all the judicial guarantees
which are recognized as indispensable by civilized
peoples.
(2) The wounded and sick shall be collected and cared
for.
An impartial humanitarian body, such as the International
Committee of the Red Cross, may offer its services to the
Parties to the conflict.
The Parties to the conflict should further endeavor to
bring into force, by means of special agreements, all or
part of the other provisions of the present Convention.
The application of the preceding provisions shall not affect
the legal status of the Parties to the conflict.1 18
117. Abi-Saab, supra note 101, at 221.
118. 1949 Geneva Conventions, supra note 97, art. 3.
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Common Article 3 applies to "low intensity, open, and
armed confrontations between relatively organized armed forces
or armed groups occurring exclusively within the territory of a
particular State."119 As Robert Kogod Goldman notes, the article
governs armed conflicts between Government forces and organ-
ized dissidents and not to mere outlawry or brief, disorganized
rebellion.12 ° It also controls when multiple armed factions
within one country battle each other without governmental
forces participating.12 1
As soon as an armed conflict is determined to exist, Com-
mon Article 3 automatically applies. The article imposes upon
the Parties to an internal armed conflict the legal obligation to
protect individuals who have not participated, or are no longer
actively participating, in the hostilities. 22 The provisions of
Common Article 3 bind all the Parties to a conflict, both govern-
mental and dissident forces. 2 ' The fact that the dissident forces
are not Parties to the Conventions does not excuse them from
complying with the rules contained therein. This can be
surmised from the language of Common Article 3 that "in the
case of armed conflict not of an international character occur-
ring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, each
Party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum, the follow-
ing provisions ....*"124 Thus, the duty to implement Common
Article 3 is unconditional for both Parties and operates indepen-
dently of the other party's obligation; and, a breach of Article 3
by one party cannot be invoked by the other party as grounds for
its non-implementation of the mandatory provisions of the
article. 125
Because of the restrictive nature of the provisions of Com-
mon Article 3, certain benefits normally conferred on members
of armed forces in warfare are not extended to internal armed
conflicts. One fundamental difference between international
and non-international armed conflicts is that there is no pro-
tected person status. 12 6 The rules pertinent to internal armed
119. See Robert Kogod Goldman, International Humanitarian Law: Americas
Watch's Experience in Monitoring Internal Armed Conflicts, 9 AM. U.J. INT'L L. &
POL'Y 49, 57 (1993).
120. See id.
121. See id; see also supra note 107 and accompanying text (Akehurst
applies a similar definition to civil war).
122. See Goldman, supra note 119, at 57; see also 1949 Geneva Conven-
tions, supra note 97, art. 3.
123. See Goldman, supra note 119, at 58.
124. 1949 Geneva Convention, supra note 97, art. 3.
125. Id
126. See How DoEs LAW PROTECT IN WAR, supra note 92, at 204.
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conflicts do not discuss the combatants' privilege or entitlement
to prisoner of war status. 127 In internal armed conflicts, Govern-
ments are not required to confer that privilege on their oppo-
nents. Waldman A. Soft notes that many Governments are
unwilling to confer prisoner of war status on rebellious combat-
ants because to do so would prevent these Governments from
enforcing their treason laws. These Governments fear that inter-
national protection for combatants in internal armed conflicts
would enhance the status of insurgents, encourage rebellion by
reducing the individual costs to rebels, and effectively give dissi-
dents "a license to kill, maim.... kidnap... and... destroy...
subject only to honorable detention as prisoners of war."
1 28
However, captured insurgents without prisoner of war status are
actually at the mercy of governmental forces. Without this pro-
tection, it is the Government that receives a license to kill or
wound enemy combatants, destroy enemy military objectives, and
cause incidental civilian casualties. Additionally, during and at
the end of hostilities, the Government can try captured rebels for
crimes committed during the conflict, in accordance with its
domestic laws. Nothing in Common Article 3 precludes this, but
such trials must conform to the standards set forth in Article 3,
and also in Article 6, of Protocol II, if applicable.' 29 However,
there is no rule that prohibits Governments from according pris-
oner of war status to insurgents in an internal armed conflict. 3 °
Generally, the provisions of Common Article 3 emphasize
basic humane treatment and minimum procedural guaran-
tees.' In the terms of the article, those who take no active part
in the hostilities, either having laid down their arms or having
been rendered hors de combat for any reason, must be treated
humanely. In this treatment, there must be no adverse distinc-
127. See Waldemar A. Soilf, The Status of Combatants in Non-International
Armed Conflicts Under Domestic Law and Transnational Practice, 33 AM. U. L. REv.
53, 54-55 (1983).
128. Id. at 59.
129. See id.
130. During the Civil War, the Government of the United States granted
limited prisoner of war treatment to captured rebel combatants without
expressly giving them immunity from prosecution for treason. See Goldman,
supra note 119, at 60; see also Operational Code of Conduct for the Nigerian
Army 4(e) (July 1967), reprinted in How Doxs LAw PROTEcr IN WAR, supra
note 92, at 793-94. The operative part reads: "Soldiers who surrender will not
be killed. They are to be disarmed and treated as prisoners of war. They are
entitled in all circumstances to humane treatment and respect for their person
and their honour [sic]." This Operational Code of Conduct was issued during
the Nigerian Civil War, wherein government forces waged war against secession-
ists who had declared the "Republic of Biafra." Id.
131. See MCCOUBREY, supra note 99, at 176.
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tion on any grounds. Specific acts are prohibited, including the
following violence toward life and person: murder, mutilation,
cruel treatment and torture, taking of hostages, outrages upon
personal dignity, and sentencing and carrying out of sentences
without the due process of law.' 32 The article also requires col-
lecting and caring for the wounded and sick,' 33 and encourages
Parties to a conflict to enact the Conventions' provisions.
3 4
B. Protocol II Additional to the Geneva Conventions
Protocol II applies to any non-international armed conflict
"which takes place in the territory of a High Contracting Party
between members of its armed forces and dissident armed forces
or other organized armed groups."135 Even though Common
Article 3 is broader in scope, the Protocol applies together with
Common Article 3.136
Protocol II has a higher threshold of applicability. It lists
certain objective qualifications, such as requiring the dissident
forces to control a definite territory, and that the control must
allow them to carry out "sustained and concerted operations."' 37
Thus, the rebels need to be able to house prisoners humanely
and provide adequate medical care to the wounded and sick.
13 1
The Protocol provides that "the wounded, sick and ship-
wrecked must be respected, treated humanely and cared for with-
out any distinction on any grounds other than medical ones."
1 39
The principal rules of Protocol I relating to the protection of
civilian populations against the effect of hostilities are extended
to non-international armed conflicts through Protocol II.140 This
is by way of analogy and as a means of interpreting the obliga-
tions of Protocol II, which also declares that "neither the civilian
population as such, nor individual civilians may be the object of
attacks .... ,141 Acts of terrorism against civilians are also prohib-
ited.'42 According to Protocol II:
132. 1949 Geneva Conventions, supra note 97, art. 3(1).
133. Id. art. 3(2).
134. See id.
135. Protocol II, supra note 90, art. 1(1).
136. See Goldman, supra note 119, at 62.
137. Id. at 63 (quoting Protocol II, supra note 90, art. 1(1)).
138. See id.
139. INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, BAsic RULES OF THE GENEVA CON-
VENTIONS AND THEIR ADDITIONAL PROTOcoLs 53 (1983).
140. Id. at 54.
141. Protocol II, supra note 90, art. 13(2).
142. See id.
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Civilians benefit from this protection as long as they do not
take a direct part in hostilities. Starvation of civilians is a
prohibited method of combat. The displacement of the
civilian population may only be ordered if safety or impera-
tive military reasons require it, and only after all possible
measures have been taken to ensure it will be received
under satisfactory conditions. 43
Article 4 of Protocol II contains provisions on humane treat-
ment, beginning with a statement of principle' 4 4 that all pro-
tected persons, "whether or not their liberty has been restricted,
are entitled to respect for their person, honour [sic] and convic-
tions and religious practices. They shall in all circumstances be
treated humanely, without any adverse distinction."' 4 5 In Article
4, there is a list of acts that are prohibited at all times and in all
places. This list repeats a number of acts already prohibited by
Common Article 3, adding such acts as corporal punishment, ter-
rorism, slavery and the slave trade, pillage, as well as threats to
commit any of these acts. 14' Children must be given the care and
aid they require.' 47  In particular, "children who have not
attained the age of fifteen years shall neither be recruited in the
armed forces or groups nor allowed to take part in hostilities." 4 '
Article 5 of Protocol II provides for "persons whose liberty
has been restricted." This provision stands in sharp contrast with
the provisions of conventional humanitarian law applicable in
international armed conflicts. 4 ' The Third Geneva Conven-
tion 1'5 ° governs the treatment of prisoners of war in international
armed conflicts, and the Fourth Geneva Convention'-' relates to
the treatment of civilians and civilian internees, among others.
Article 5 of Protocol II deals with all persons deprived of, or
restricted in, their liberty for reasons related to the conflict.
However, the Article does not make any distinction among the
reasons for restricted liberty.'5 2 This underscores the fact that
there is no special "prisoner of war" regime in Protocol II.
According to Kalshoven, it is immaterial whether a person is
143. Id. arts. 13(3), 14 & 17.
144. FRIrs KALSHOVEN, CONSTRAINTS ON THE WAGING OF WAR 140 (Int'l
Comm. of the Red Cross 2d 1991).
145. Protocol II, supra note 90, art. 4(1).
146. See id. art. 4(2); see also KALSHOVEN, supra note 144, at 140.
147. See Protocol II, supra note 90, art. 4(3).
148. Id. art. 4(3)(c).
149. KA.LsHOVEN, supra note 144, at 141.
150. See Third Geneva Convention, supra note 97.
151. See Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 97.
152. KAmsHOVEN, supra note 144, at 142.
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taken prisoner as a "participant in hostilities," or on the suspi-
cion that he "incited to armed rebellion against the legitimate
government," or because he engaged in espionage for one or the
other side."53 Persons detained or interned for reasons related
to the armed conflict must be accorded all guarantees with
respect to medical care, food, hygiene, safety, relief, the practice
of their religion, and working conditions.154
Article 6 of Protocol II enumerates the rules for penal prose-
cutions of criminal offenses related to the armed conflict.
15 5
Sentences are pronounced only by courts offering the essential
guarantees of independence and impartiality. 15 6 Accused per-
sons must be afforded all necessary rights and means of
defense157 and the act or omission must constitute a criminal
offense under the law at the time it was committed.15 There is a
prohibition of the death penalty for those who are under eigh-
teen years at the time of the offense and for pregnant women or
mothers of young children." 9 Article Six recommends granting
"the broadest possible amnesty" to persons who have participated
in the armed conflict and to those deprived of their liberty for
reasons related to the armed conflict, whether they are interned
or detained.' 60 Granting amnesty is a very delicate issue that fre-
quently arises as a consequence of internal armed conflicts and is
recommended in order to create circumstances conducive to
peaceful co-existence. 161 However, in a letter to the Prosecutor
of the I.C.T.Y., a representative of the I.C.R.C. clarified the scope
of the amnesty in Article 6(5) by stating that it could not be inter-
preted to support impunity for violations of international
humanitarian law.
162
C. Rules of International Humanitarian Law as a Whole
Certain conflicts arise in which it may be possible to apply
the rules of international humanitarian law as a whole.
1 63
153. Id.
154. See Protocol II, supra note 90, art. 5(1).
155. See id. art. 6(1).
156. See id. art. 6(2).
157. See id. art. 6(2)(a).
158. See id. art. 6(2)(c).
159. See id. art. 6(4).
160. See id. art. 6(5).
161. See KALSHOVEN, supra note 144, at 142.
162. See INTER-AMERICAN COMM. ON HUM. RTS., THIRD REPORT ON THE
COuNTRY SITUATION IN COLOMBIA, ch. IV (1999), available at http://
www.cidh.oas.org/countryrep/Colom99en/chapter-4.htm.
163. See How DoEs LAw PROTECT IN WAR, supra note 92, at 211.
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1. Recognition of Belligerency by the Government
According to Kelsen, one exception to the rule that war can
exist only in relation among States is the instance where the
insurgents in a civil war are recognized as a belligerent power."'
In such a case, the whole of the provisions of international
humanitarian law is applicable. Belligerency, according to
Cond6, is an armed conflict of a non-international or interna-
tional character that is governed by international law. When the
term is applied to non-international armed conflict, it means that
the level of conflict has risen to the point where the State recog-
nizes a state of belligerency, as opposed to mere insurgency, or
rebellion. When applied to international armed conflict, it
means that the States involved have recognized the conflict as
having risen to the level of belligerency, thus engaging the appli-
cation of international law.
165
The Nigerian Civil War is an example of the situation
described above. The Nigerian Government recognized a state
of belligerency when secessionist rebels declared the "Republic
of Biafra" in May 1967. In prosecuting the war against the rebels,
the Nigerian Government adopted an "Operational Code of
Conduct"166 to guide its soldiers, which was essentially a reaffir-
mation of the principles in the Geneva Conventions of 1949.167
Without such recognition, the conflict would have been regu-
lated by the sparse rules of customary international law applica-
ble to internal armed conflicts. 16' Even though Nigeria was a
signatory to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, it was bound to
apply only the provisions of Common Article 3 of the Conven-
tions relating to internal armed conflicts, and if possible, the
164. See KELSEN, supra note 106, at 32. According to Oppenheim:
In the proper sense of the term a civil war exists when two opposing
parties within a State have recourse to arms for the purpose of
obtaining power in the State, or when a large portion of the popula-
tion of a State rises in arms against the legitimate Government. As war
is an armed contention between States, such a civil war need not be war
from the beginning, nor become war at all, in the technical sense of
the term. But it may become war through the recognition of the con-
tending parties, or insurgents, as a belligerent Power.
See 2 OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAw: A TREATIsE, DispuTEs, WAR AND NEU-
TRAPITr 209 (H. Lauterpacht ed., 7th ed. 1948-52).
165. See CoND9, supra note 91, at 13.
166. OPERATIONAL CODE OF CONDUCT FOR THE NIGERIAN ARMY, reprinted in
How DOES LAW PROTECT IN WAR, supra note 92, at 793.
167. See 1949 Geneva Conventions, supra note 97.
168. See Colombia, Constitutional Conformity of Protocol II, Ruling No. C-225/
95, Re: File No. L.A.T.-040 (Republic of Colombia Constitutional Court),
reprinted in How DOEs LAw PROTECT IN WAR, supra note 92, at 1357 14,
1360-61.
CONFLICT IN SIERRA LEONE
whole of the Geneva Conventions subject to an agreement
between the Government and the secessionist forces, 69 which
was highly unlikely at that point in time. The recognition of bel-
ligerency was a unilateral act on the part of the Nigerian
Government.
In any conflict where there is recognition of a state of bellig-
erency, the Parties are bound by the whole of the provisions of
international humanitarian law applicable in armed conflicts. In
Prosecutor v. Tadic, the I.C.T.Y. noted that it is an established prin-
ciple of customary international law that the laws of war might
become applicable to non-international armed conflicts of a cer-
tain intensity through the doctrine of "recognition of
belligerency. "170
2. Special Agreements Among the Parties
Parties to an internal armed conflict can also agree to imple-
ment the whole of international humanitarian law in the course
of the conflict. According to Common Article 3,171 the Parties to
an internal armed conflict should endeavor to bring into force,
by means of special agreements, all or part of the other provi-
sions of the Geneva Conventions of 1949.172
An example is the Memorandum of Understanding of
November 27, 1991, between Yugoslavia and Croatia.'17  The
memorandum was agreed upon with the assistance of the
I.C.R.C. when the conflict in the former Yugoslavia was still con-
sidered a non-international armed conflict.174 In the agreement,
however, the Parties refrained from mentioning Common Article
3 in the text of the agreement. 175 In Prosecutor v. Tadic,176 the
International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia noted the
agreement between the various factions in the conflict in Bosnia
169. See 1949 Geneva Conventions, supra note 97, Common Art. 3.
170. Prosecutor v. Tadic, No. IT-94-1-T (I.C.T.Y. May 7, 1997) (Opinion
and Judgment), 36 I.L.M. 908 (1997) [hereinafter Tadic Opinion]; see also LES-
LIE C. GREEN, ESSAYS ON THE MODERN LAW OF WAR 218 (1999).
171. See 1949 Geneva Conventions, supra note 97, Common Art. 3.
172. See 1949 Geneva Conventions, supra note 97.
173. YUGOSLAVIA/CROATIA, MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING OF NOVEM-
BER 27, 1991, reprinted in How DOES LAw PROTECT IN WAR, supra note 92, at
1109.
174. See also BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA, AGREEMENT No. 1 OF MAY 22, 1992
(agreeing to respect the rules of international humanitarian law in the course
of the conflict in Bosnia), reprinted in How DOES LAw PROTECT IN WAR, Supra
note 92, at 1112 [hereinafter BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA AGREEMENT].
175. See Tadic Appeal, supra note 93, reprinted in How DoES LAw PROTECT
IN WAR, supra note 92, at 1171.
176. See id.
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Herzegovina.' 7 7 This agreement was based on Common Article
3 of the Geneva Conventions, and it committed the Parties to
abide by the substantive rules of internal armed conflict con-
tained in Common Article 3. In addition, the Parties agreed on
the strength of Common Article 3, paragraph 3, to apply certain
provisions of the Geneva Conventions concerning international
armed conflicts. According to the Tribunal, "[c]learly, this
Agreement shows that the Parties concerned regarded the armed
conflicts in which they were involved as internal but, in view of
their magnitude, they agreed to extend the application of some
provisions of the Geneva Conventions that are normally applica-
ble in international armed conflicts only."'78 The I.C.R.C. was
the facilitator for the two agreements aforementioned and as the
Yugoslav Tribunal rightly noted, the I.C.R.C. would have acted
contrary to the provisions of the 1949 Geneva Conventions had it
not believed that the conflicts governed by the agreements were
internal.1
79
D. Obligations of the Parties to the Conflict
Sierra Leone is a party to the Four Geneva Conventions of
1949, from which it succeeded in 1965; and the two Additional
Protocols of 1977, which it ratified in 1986.18° With respect to
the conflict, it should not be a matter of dispute that the provi-
sions of Common Article 3 are applicable. For the duration of
the conflict, the Government remained bound by its obligations
under the Geneva Conventions. At no time did the Government
seek to renounce its obligations or limit the applicability of the
conventions. Protocol II also pertains to the conflict, since it
applies in non-international armed conflicts.
The conflict in Sierra Leone was not one with fixed inten-
sity. It ranged between low and high intensity at different times.
In this case, however, there seems to be no dispute among the
belligerents as to the applicability of the rules, so that while there
177. See id. at 1193 (citing BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA AGREEMENT, supra
note 174).
178. Tadic Appeal, supra note 93, at 1 73, in How DoEs LAw PRoTEcr IN
WAR, supra note 92, at 1171.
179. See id.
180. The Government of Sierra Leone succeeded to the 1949 Geneva
Conventions on June 10, 1965. This had retrospective effect, because the act of
succession followed the ratification of the Conventions by the United Kingdom,
the colonial master of Sierra Leone, and, thus, the Geneva Conventions
entered into force for Sierra Leone on April 27, 1961, the date of indepen-
dence. See Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949: Succession, June 10, 1965,
available at http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/d49c744360dadc07c1256314002ee738
(Sierra Leone: Ratifications/Accessions).
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was difference in intensity, applicability of the rules was not an
issue during the conflict. Until recently, the main issue was the
complete disregard for the rules, particularly by the rebels.
The rules applicable during the conflict, while including
Common Article 3 and Additional Protocol II, may not extend to
the 1949 Geneva Conventions in their entirety. There was no
formal recognition of belligerency by the Government for the
duration of the conflict, nor was there any special agreement
between the Parties to bring into operation the whole existing
body of international humanitarian law. But at different stages
of the conflict, the I.C.R.C. called upon the Parties to respect the
relevant provisions of humanitarian law,"' stressing the adher-
ence of Sierra Leone to the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the
Additional Protocols. The I.C.R.C. did not insist that the whole
of humanitarian law was applicable to the conflict in Sierra
Leone; this is more or less demanded of E.C.O.M.O.G.
Even though it cannot be asserted that the whole of interna-
tional humanitarian law is applicable to the conflict in Sierra
Leone, the rules in Common Article 3 and Additional Protocol
II, if fully complied with, contain some guarantees for civilians
who are neither Parties to nor combatants in the conflict. There-
fore, if there are violations of those rules, those responsible for
such violations should be made to face the consequences.
Regarding the capacity of the actors, the R.U.F. had the req-
uisite organizational capacity to implement the rules of humani-
tarian law as required in Protocol I. The R.U.F. held territorial
control over some parts of the country, including the eastern
parts, and their actions were not confined merely to cross-border
raids. At some point, the R.U.F. could not sustain momentum,
but later they gained the upper hand in the conflict, nearly
entering Freetown before E.O. repelled them in an offensive in
1995. The combined R.U.F. and A.F.R.C. forces actually entered
the capital Freetown in January 1999, causing mayhem in the city
before the forces were repelled by E.C.O.M.O.G.
The A.F.R.C. also had capacity to implement the provisions
of Protocol II. The A.F.R.C. consisted mainly of members of the
armed forces who rebelled against the Government of President
181. For example, in June 1997, the I.C.R.C. addressed a memorandum
on respect for international humanitarian law to the Executive Secretariat of
E.C.O.W.A.S. in Abuja, Nigeria, which was to be forwarded to Member States
with troops in Sierra Leone and to the Nigerian Chief of Defense Staff, in
Lagos. The memorandum was also submitted to E.C.O.M.O.G. in Liberia. See
INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, UPDATE No. 97/102 ON I.C.R.C. AclvrrlEs IN
SIERRA LEONE, June 10, 1997, available at http://www.icrc.org/eng/africa
(Sierra Leone).
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Kabbah and many of them had fought the R.U.F. before the
groups united as allies. Individuals within the group who violate
humanitarian law can be held responsible for such violations.
IV. VIOLATIONS OF RuLEs OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN
LAW IN THE CONFLICT IN SIERRA LEONE
At nearly every stage of the conflict, there have been serious
violations of the rules of international humanitarian law applica-
ble to internal conflicts, particularly as enumerated in the pre-
ceding chapter.'82 These violations have not been exclusive to
any of the Parties; indeed, all Parties to the conflict, including
the E.C.O.W.A.S. Monitoring Group serving as peacekeepers,
have been accused of violations of the law. Even though viola-
tions of humanitarian law do not depend on the degree of viola-
tions by one or the other party, the rebels committed the greater
part of the violations in the conflict in Sierra Leone. Whatever
the degree of violations by either or all of the Parties to the con-
flict, responsibility attaches to every act of violation of the law.
This conflict has been one of the most brutal conflicts in
African history. Nearly half of Sierra Leone's 4.5 million people
were internally displaced, while about 500,000 people are
believed to be refugees in neighboring countries.183 The conflict
claimed at least 50,000 lives, and there are an estimated 100,000
mutilation victims.184 The majority of the dead and the mutilated
are victims of R.U.F., and later A.F.R.C., brutality.
A. The Republic of Sierra Leone Military Forces (R.S.L.M.F.),
E.C.O.M.O.G., and C.D.F.
At the outset, the conflict was mainly between the armed
forces of Sierra Leone and the R.U.F. Responsibility for viola-
tions of humanitarian law at that stage of the conflict lies solely
with the armed forces and the R.U.F. The armed forces commit-
ted acts of brutality just like the R.U.F., including murders, but
particularly, looting and pillaging; 8 ' the frequency of these acts
increased as new recruits entered the force.
Common Article 3 prohibits violence of all sorts against life
and persons, including murder, mutilation, cruel treatment, and
torture. Despite this provision and its adherence to the 1949
182. See supra Part III.
183. See Q&A: Sierra Leone's Hostages, BBC NEWS ONLINE, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/africa (May 5, 2000).
184. See id.
185. Pillaging is prohibited by Article 4. See Protocol II, supra note 90,
art. 4(2) (g).
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Geneva Conventions and its additional Protocols, the Govern-
ment forces (and their allies) engaged in these prohibited acts.
Throughout the war zone and in many civilian areas, there were
summary executions of prisoners and noncombatants, several
cases of rape, mutilation, and civilian killings.
At various stages of the conflict, the Government and its
allies summarily executed suspected rebels and suspected rebel
collaborators. In January 1999, E.C.O.M.O.G. troops were
alleged to have summarily executed twenty-two rebel captives and
shot at least six suspected rebel collaborators in February 1999.
Several others were killed in the course of house-to-house
searches by E.C.O.M.O.G. for rebel collaborators and infiltrators
in Freetown. 186 According to a report by Human Rights Watch,
Government and E.C.O.M.O.G. forces carried out more than 180
summary executions of rebels and their suspected collaborators
in the course of the January offensive against the R.U.F. s7 All
sides showed little respect for captured combatants, with com-
mon extra judicial execution following surrender."' 8
Prior to the 1996 elections, both Government soldiers and
rebel forces terrorized many villages, cutting off fingers, hands,
arms, ears, or lips with machetes."8 9 Sometimes these acts were
those of renegade Government soldiers, and the Government
only prosecuted a few of the cases in which there were violations.
At the early stages of the conflict, there were a few court-martials
of erring members of the Sierra Leonean army. Soldiers accused
of serious offenses were transferred from field units to the Head-
quarters for trial. There are no certain statistics, but the court-
martial system is reported to have convicted military personnel
for murder, robbery, and other offenses,19 ° although such con-
victions later became a rarity. It appears that as rebels commit-
ted far graver offenses, it became harder to hold the military to
higher standards, particularly as the rebel assault grew.
The summary executions usually took place within the con-
text of joint operations involving E.C.O.M.O.G. and C.D.F.-
Kamajo forces. After E.C.O.M.O.G. identified suspected rebels
186. DEP'T OF STATE, 106th CONG., CoUNTRY REPORTS ON HuMAN RIGHTS
AND PRACTICES FOR 1999 434 (Joint Comm. Print 2000) [hereinafter SIERRA
LEONE CoUNTRY REPORT 1999].
187. HUMAN RTS. WATCH, HuMAN RIGHTS WATCH WORLD REPORT 2000 67
(2000) [hereinafter H.R.W. WORLD REPORT 2000].
188. See id. at 69.
189. See DEP'T OF STATE, 105th CONG., CouNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN
RIGHTS AND PRACTICES FOR 1996 244 (Joint Comm. Print 1997) [hereinafter
SIEmRRA LEONE CoUNTRY REPORT 1996].
190. See id. at 245.
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or collaborators, they were frequently handed over to, and exe-
cuted by, the C.D.F.-Kamajos. Also, members of local unarmed
civil defense units (C.D.U.s), who during and after the offensive
helped to maintain checkpoints around Freetown, frequently
played a part in identifying rebels and their collaborators."'
According to Human Rights Watch, it is difficult to ascertain the
level at which the E.C.O.M.O.G., C.D.F., and R.S.L.M.F. high
command were aware of or sanctioned these killings. But as the
killings were often carried out in highly public places and in
front of very large groups of people, it is likely that knowledge of
the executions reached the highest levels of command.
192
The difficult conditions under which the forces operate also
make the situation worse. Many E.C.O.M.O.G. soldiers in Sierra
Leone have been traumatized by the rebel atrocities they have
seen in that country. One E.C.O.M.O.G. soldier, reported to
have participated in an operation in which an execution took
place, said, "We have a proper code of conduct. We know about
the Geneva Conventions and have taken prisoners in the past,
but this time was different. The things these people do. This
time my unit took very few prisoners."193 Another soldier said,
"In many ways we felt we were doing it for the people. Some-
times we wonder if these rebels are human. After everything
they've done, it was best to eliminate them."194
Even though there is no empirical data to back this up, it
appears the attitude of the E.C.O.M.O.G. soldiers mentioned
above was pervasive among the troops, granted the scale of atroc-
ities committed by the rebels since the beginning of the conflict.
But the problems and difficulties faced by the E.C.O.M.O.G.
forces particularly do not excuse violations of the law committed
by them. International law does not recognize abuses by one
party to a conflict as being the legitimate ground for retaliatory
abuses. Even if these were cases of reprisals, which are permitted
under international law in exceptional cases, they are not
excused in this conflict because reprisals are not permitted
under international humanitarian law.' 95 Further, the obligation
to respect and ensure respect for the Geneva Conventions is an
independent obligation by each party to a conflict and is not con-
tingent on respect by the other party. Common Article 3 pro-




195. See 1949 Geneva Conventions, supra note 97, arts. 20, 46/47/13/33,
53-56; see also Additional Protocol I, supra note 98 (prohibiting reprisals in inter-
national armed conflicts).
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vides in part that "each Party to the conflict shall be bound to
apply, as a minimum, the following provisions .... 1
96
With regard to theJanuary 1999 E.C.O.M.O.G. offensive, no
E.C.O.M.O.G. soldiers or officers have been formally investigated
or court-martialed as a result of their conduct. According to its
Chief Information Officer, there is within E.C.O.M.O.G. an inter-
nal mechanism set up for the investigation of violations of inter-
national humanitarian law, and although E.C.O.M.O.G. heard of
individual complaints, none have been sufficient to activate the
mechanism.197 But, according to another E.C.O.M.O.G. com-
mander, there have been a few lower level investigations of
executions following complaints by members of the public. Such
allegations "were proven to be baseless and subsequently
dropped."19 He reiterated the fact that there have been no for-
mal inquiries or disciplinary actions taken against any soldier or
officer under his command following the January 1999 rebel
offensive. 199
Following a UN report in February 1999200 that expressed
concern about summary executions, the E.C.O.M.O.G. high
command indicated to the UN Secretary-General's Representa-
tive in Sierra Leone, Francis Okello, their intention to investigate
and to take corrective action as necessary. And in April 1999, the
E.C.O.M.O.G. Force Commander in Sierra Leone established a
Civil/Military Relations Committee to investigate allegations of
human rights violations against individual members of
E.C.O.M.O.G. and C.D.F. and to recommend appropriate action
to the high authorities. However, the starting date for com-
plaints to be investigated was April 1, 1999, thus removing from
investigation executions committed in January and February of
1999, and earlier operations.
20 1
Apart from summary executions, there were cases of torture
committed by these forces. At various times, each of these forces
was reported to have engaged in acts of brutality against the civil-
ian population. There were also acts of looting, confiscation of
property, and general mistreatment of the civilian population.
Beyond that, there were cases of arbitrary arrests and detention
of noncombatants, particularly of those suspected of having col-.
196. See 1949 Geneva Conventions, supra note 97, art. 3 (emphasis
added).
197. See GE=rING AWAY wrrH MURDER, supra note 82, at V.
198. Id.
199. See id.
200. See Fifth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mis-
sion in Sierra Leone, 7, U.N. Doc. S/1999/237 (1999).
201. See GETrlNG AWAY wrrH MURDER, supra note 82, at V.
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laborated with, or supported, the rebels. In some cases, they
were released only after their families paid a sum to secure their
release.2 °2
B. The KU.F./S.L. and the A.F.R.C.
The R.U.F. has waged a very brutal war against successive
Governments in Sierra Leone since 1991. The rebels started the
conflict with serious violations of humanitarian law. After its ini-
tial assault on eastern Sierra Leone in 1991, the R.U.F. envisaged
support of those in the border region, particularly as they had
been opposed to the ruling APC for many years. Because of this,
the R.U.F. seized and summarily executed chiefs, traders, village
elders, agricultural project workers, and other Government
agents. It also made forcible attempts to recruit individuals
known locally for their opposition to the A.P.C. regime.20 3 As
the conflict progressed, any deserter from the R.U.F. ranks was
tattooed with R.U.F. "ID" and risked summary execution by both
R.U.F. and the Sierra Leonean army. 204 The violations began
very early, and with no one able to curb the R.U.F., the serious-
ness of the violations grew.
Since the conflict began, the rebels of the R.U.F. were the
undisputed masters in the commission of heinous crimes. They
had a particularly brutal strategy that included torture, physical
mutilation, and murder of civilians. There were cases of amputa-
tions by machetes of one or both hands, one or more fingers,
arms, feet, legs, ears, and buttocks; lacerations to the head, neck,
arms, legs, feet, and torso; the gouging out of one or both eyes;
rape; gunshot wounds to the head, torso, and limbs; bums from
explosives and other devices; injections with acid; and beatings.
There were also reports of sexual mutilation, such as the cutting
off of breasts and genitalia, among other atrocities.
20 5
Before the 1996 elections, as noted earlier, both Govern-
ment soldiers and rebel forces terrorized many villages, con-
ducting a campaign of physical mutilation of many people.
202. See SIERRA LEONE COUNTRY REPORT 1999; see also GETTING AWAY WITH
MURDER, supra note 82, at V.
203. See Abdullah & Muana, supra note 4, at 178.
204. See id. at 180.
205. See Human Rights Abuses Committed by RUF Rebels, 11 SIERRA LEONE:
GETTING AWAY WITH MURDER, MUTILATION, RAPE 3(A), Sec. IV (Human Rights
Watch, New York, N.Y. July 1999), available at http://www.hrw.org/hrw/
reports/ 1999/sierra/SIERLE99-04.htm [hereinafter Sowing Terror]; see also
AMNESTY INT'L, SIERRA LEONE: TowARDS A FUTURE FOUNDED ON HuMAN RIGHTs
(Sept. 25, 1996), available at http://www.web.amnesty.org/ai.nsf/index/
AFR510051996.
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Some had slogans denouncing the elections cut into their back
and chests, 2° 6 ostensibly by the R.U.F., which was opposed to the
elections. While responsibility in the southern province was hard
to determine, the R.U.F. conducted many attacks in the northern
province. Several victims had their hands amputated. Others
had "No Elections" cut into their backs or "R.U.F." cut into their
foreheads. Fingers, upper lips, and ears were amputated. On
February 22, 1996, one man from Sumbuy, Lubu Chiefdom had
"R.U.F." and "No Elections" cut into his forehead and back.
Also, his upper lip and right ear were cut off.20 7 This action was
typical of the R.U.F. campaign as it passed through many parts of
Sierra Leone.
Prior to the May 1997 coup, R.U.F. forces continued attack-
ing the civilian population with the same ferocity. In addition to
attacking villages; ambushing travelers; and killing, torturing,
raping, and mutilating civilians; the R.U.F. also abducted chil-
dren and forced them to commit atrocities, including the torture
and murder of their relatives. The R.U.F. also raped and sexually
abused young girls and women during attacks.
20 8
After the A.F.R.C. took power in May 1997, the R.U.F. and
the A.F.R.C. combined forces to form the Peoples' Army of
Sierra Leone. Thereafter, the combined R.U.F./A.F.R.C. forces
committed greater violations of humanitarian law and the scale
of human rights abuses escalated and took on grotesque
forms.2 9 There were several extra judicial tortures, mutilations,
rapes, beatings, illegal searches, arbitrary arrests and detentions,
and killings of unarmed civilians.2"' All of these were in violation
of the guarantees contained in Common Article 3 of the 1949
Geneva Conventions211 and in Additional Protocol 11.112 For the
latter half of 1997, there was fierce fighting between A.F.R.C./
R.U.F. forces and the Kamajo militia in several areas of the coun-
try, with the A.F.R.C./R.U.F. forces routinely summarily execut-
ing captured Kamajo militiamen. In addition, A.F.R.C./R.U.F.
forces often tortured civilians, shot them, and looted their prop-
erty while searching for the Kamajos.
213
206. See SIERRA LEONE COUNTRY REPORT 1996, supra note 189, at 244.
207. See id.
208. See SIERRA LEONE COUNTRY REPORT 1997, supra note 58, at 299.
209. See A YEAR OF ATROCITIES AGAINST CrvitiANs, supra note 82.
210. See SIEmRA LEONE COUNTRY REPORT 1997, supra note 58, at 299.
211. See 1949 Geneva Conventions, supra note 97, Common Art. 3.
212. See Protocol II, supra note 90, art. 4.
213. See DEP'T OF STATE, 106th CONG., COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN
RIGHTS AND PRACTICES FOR 1998, at 368 (Joint Comm. Print 1999) [hereinafter
SIERRA LEONE COUNTRY REPORT 1998]. In 1998, "[g]overnment security forces
retaking areas discovered mass graves of those killed by rebel forces in Bo (over
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In February 1998, E.C.O.M.O.G. forces launched an offen-
sive on Freetown in response to attacks on its bases outside Free-
town. This offensive succeeded in driving the A.F.R.C./R.U.F.
out of power. Chaos and violence ensued, which demonstrated
the A.F.R.C./R.U.F. regime's utter disdain for any rules of civi-
lized behavior. As in the previous years, civilians were the main
victims. Joined by Liberian fighters, the A.F.R.C./R.U.F. forces
also looted and destroyed homes and went from house to house
to kill those suspected of opposing them.2" 4
Throughout the year, A.F.R.C./R.U.F. forces continued with
egregious violations, including brutal killings, severe mutilations,
and deliberate dismemberments in a widespread campaign of
terror against the civilian population, known as "Operation No
Living Thing." As they retreated from Freetown after the
E.C.O.M.O.G. assault, they continued these acts, particularly the
vicious acts of cutting off the ears, noses, hands, arms, and legs of
noncombatants who were unwilling to cooperate with, or provide
for, the insurgents. The victims ranged from small children to
elderly women; in some cases, one limb was cut off, in others, two
limbs, typically two hands or arms. A.F.R.C./R.U.F. forces also
detained, decapitated, burned alive, and inflicted bullet and
machete wounds on civilians; many died from their wounds
before they could receive any form of treatment. They abducted
anyone in sight, including missionaries and aid workers, and they
ambushed relief convoys and raided refugee sites, as well. There
was also the abduction of villagers, using them as forced laborers,
sex slaves, and as human shields in fighting with Government
and E.C.O.M.O.G. forces. Boys were forced to become child
soldiers, and rape was used as a terror tactic against women.215
In some cases, R.U.F. forces would require captives to draw a slip
of paper from a hat with the word "hand," "leg," "eyes," or "life"
on the paper, indicating what the rebels would take from them.
Sometimes rebel soldiers forced those they abducted, including
children, to commit atrocities against their own family
members.
2 16
In January 1999, the rebels again attacked Freetown,
momentarily capturing parts of the city from Government troops
100 bodies) and on Bonthe island [sic] (more than 550 bodies); the latter had
been considered a Kamajoh C.D.F. stronghold, and the killings apparently were
reprisals against islanders for supporting the Kamajohs." Id.
214. See A YEAR OF ATROCmES AGAINST CILIANS, supra note 82.
215. See SIERRA LEONE COUNTRY REPORT 1998, supra note 213, at 369.
216. See HUMAN RTS. WATCH, FORGOTTEN CHILDREN OF WAR: SIERRA
LEONE REFUGEE CHILDREN IN GUINEA (1999), available at http://www.hrw.org/
hrw/reports/1999/guinea/guine997-03.htm#P253_40768.
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and E.C.O.M.O.G. forces. The battle for Freetown and the three-
week rebel occupation of the city were characterized by system-
atic attacks and widespread perpetration of all sorts of atrocities
against the civilian population. It was perhaps the most intensive
period of fighting in all of the years of the conflict in Sierra
Leone.217
Following the E.C.O.M.O.G. offensive to recapture Free-
town, the rebels withdrew and continued to commit large-scale
atrocities as they retreated. The rebels murdered at least 2,000
persons, and the victims were chosen randomly. The rebels cut
off the limbs of many people, including multiple cases of double-
arm amputations. There was systematic, organized, and wide-
spread sexual violence against girls and women, including indi-
vidual and gang rape, with girls less than seventeen years of age
being the specific targets. Some were held in sexual slavery after
being "married" to rebel combatants. 218 The horrific practice of
mutilation continued until the signing of the Lom6 peace
agreement.
The rebels also systematically set large sections of central
and eastern Freetown on fire, destroying most of it and render-
ing tens of thousands of persons homeless.219 In Freetown,
entire city blocks, embassies, Government buildings, factories,
churches, mosques, and historical landmarks were set on fire;
and, housing authorities registered the destruction of 5,788
homes and residential buildings. The towns of Masiaka and
Songo were also set on fire, as were scores of villages in their
environs. 220
According to UN and health officials' estimates, between
5,000 and 6,500 combatants and civilian residents were killed in
and near the capital, Freetown, before the rebels were driven out
by Government and E.C.O.M.O.G. forces.22 More than 3,800
children and 570 adults were reported as missing or abducted
following the rebel offensive. In all, the UN estimates that rebel
forces abducted some 20,000 persons throughout the country
during 1991-1999, and only a negligible number have been
released.2 2
217. See H.R.W. WORLD REPORT 2000, supra note 187, at 67.
218. See id. at 68.
219. See SIERRA LEONE CouNTRY REPORT 1999, supra note 186, at 433.
220. See H.R.W. WoRLD REPORT 2000, supra note 187, at 68. "There was
some destruction due to indiscriminate bombing by E.C.O.M.O.G. jets, particu-
larly in the northern town of Kambia." Id.
221. See SIERRA LEONE COUNTRY REPORT 1999, supra note 186, at 433.
222. See id; see also H.R.W. WORLD REPORT 2000, supra note 187, at 68.
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The abuses perpetrated by the R.U.F. and the A.F.R.C. con-
stitute the most egregious violations of international humanita-
rian law. The rules enunciated earlier are the minimum that
each of the Parties to the conflict is bound to apply. The rebels
made no distinction between civilians and military targets and
sought to punish civilians for what they perceived to be the civil-
ians' support for the existing Government. Such arbitrary attacks
contributed to the climate of terror.
2 23
The prohibitions in Common Article 3 and in Protocol II
are not for governmental forces only, but are directed to all Par-
ties to an internal conflict. Virtually all the prohibitions in the
rules have been violated by the rebels and the Government
forces; the Government's C.D.F. allies and E.C.O.M.O.G. forces
bear some responsibility for violations of the law as well. Because
of the large number of those involved in perpetrating the crimes,
it may be difficult to assign individual responsibility in order to
redress the violations of the law and give redress to surviving vic-
tims. However, this problem should not stand in the way of giv-
ing redress to victims of these horrendous violations, not only to
assuage their grief, but also to serve notice that these kinds of
crimes will not go unpunished.
Efforts to hold individuals responsible obviously cannot be
limited to the foot soldiers that perpetrated the crimes; they must
also include the commanders and the leadership of the R.U.F.
and the A.F.R.C. In fact, if there is to be any selectivity in prose-
cuting those responsible for the crimes, the commanders are the
ones who should be prosecuted and punished. They gave the
orders and had the ability to stop the crimes but did nothing.
This does not excuse the foot soldiers, but if there must be lim-
ited prosecutions, it should start with the commanders of the
rebel forces.
V. RETURN TO PEACE IN SIERRA LEONE
The world rests on three pillars: on truth, on justice[,] and on
peace.
-Rabban Simeon ben Gamaliel, (Abot 1, 18)224
223. See GETrING AWAy "WITH MURDER, supra note 82, at IV.
224. M. Cherif Bassiouni, Searching for Peace and Achieving Justice: The Need
for Accountability, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 9, 9 (1996) (quoting Rabban
Simeon ben Gamaliel, "A Talmudic commentary adds to this, saying: 'The three
are really one. If justice is realized, truth is vindicated and peace results.'"
(Abot 1, 18)).
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If You Want Peace, Work For Justice.
-Pope Paul V1
2 2 5
There is a need to break the cycle of impunity in Sierra
Leone and return the country to peace. The various actors in
the conflict, particularly the rebels, have often operated beyond
the reach of, and without any regard whatsoever for, the law. Ini-
tially, there was some prosecution and punishment of Govern-
ment soldiers found responsible for crimes committed in the
course of the conflict;22 6 however, prosecutions were not
commonplace.
Subject to the constraints of international law, countries
decide for themselves the means and method by which they end
conflicts and by which they make peace.2 27 In the case of Sierra
Leone, the options before it were limited, particularly because
the governance structure has been very weak for long periods
and the Government of Sierra Leone is not in a position to assert
itself militarily to gain outright victory.
Michael Reisman identifies military victory as one technique
available for stopping war and making peace in non-interna-
tional conflicts. 22 Other techniques identified include: creating
or importing a Caesar or strongman to re-establish minimum
order; partition of the State; integration or reintegration, often
through the use of force; plebiscites and elections; and the adop-
tion of Governments of national unity. 29 Reisman adds another
option: the use of international criminal tribunals in stopping
wars and making peace. 2 "° This has been used only on limited
occasions; for example, for the conflict in the former Yugoslavia
and for the genocide in Rwanda.
The relative weakness of the State has compelled Sierra
Leone to end the conflict by taking the course of reconciliation,
which involves the formation of an all-inclusive Government.
That was why it chose to enter into negotiations with the rebels-
first, for a cease-fire, and then, for a permanent end to hostilities.
225. Pope Paul VI, If You Want Peace, Work for Justice: Message of His Holiness
Pope Paul Vlfor the Celebration of the "World Day of Peace, "January 1, 1972, in WAYS
OF PEACE: PAPAL MESSAGES FOR THE WORLD DAYS OF PEACE (1968-1986) 45
(1986).
226. See AMNESTY INT'L, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT 1993 255; see also
SIERRA LEONE COUNTRY REPORT 1996, supra note 189, at 245.
227. Cf W. Michael Reisman, Stopping Wars and Making Peace: Reflections
on the Ideology and Practice of Conflict Termination in Contemporary World Politics, 6
TUL. J. INT'L & CoMp. L. 5, 6 (1998).
228. See id. at 41.
229. See id. at 41-46.
230. See id. at 46.
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A. Peace Accords
Various attempts have been made to return the country to
peace, with the signing of peace accords by the Government and
the rebels. The first comprehensive peace accord was signed in
November 1996, after nine months of negotiations begun by the
N.P.R.C. military Government and concluded by the elected Gov-
ernment of President Kabbah. As part of the peace accord, there
was a grant of amnesty to the rebels absolving them of responsi-
bility for previous crimes.2 ' This grant was made in the name of
peace.
The R.U.F. never complied with the terms of the accord,
which soon broke down. There was no action taken with respect
to violations of humanitarian law, in line with the provisions of
the accord. It soon became clear that an amnesty would not end
the violations. Following the takeover of power by the A.F.R.C.,
there was another peace accord, signed in October 1997, which
was to pave the way for the restoration of President Kabbah to
office. This accord was negotiated by E.C.O.W.A.S. and the
A.F.R.C./R.U.F. regime under intense pressure from
E.C.O.W.A.S., which wanted President Kabbah restored to
power. Titled the "E.C.O.W.A.S. Six-Month Peace Plan for Sierra
Leone," the accord contained an "immunities from prosecu-
tions" clause. Clause 8 of the Peace Plan on "Immunities and
Guarantees" provided that " [i] t is ... essential that unconditional
immunities and guarantees from prosecution be extended to all
involved in the unfortunate events of 25 May 1997 with effect
from 22 May 1998. "2s2 The "unfortunate events" in reference
included the army takeover of power on May 25, 1997, and the
consequent abuses committed by the A.F.R.C./R.U.F. regime.
By the terms of the Peace Plan, the A.F.R.C./R.U.F. regime
was expected to quit power peacefully in favor of the ousted Kab-
bah Government on May 22, 1998. However, E.C.O.M.O.G.
intervened to forcefully remove the regime from power in Febru-
ary 1998, when it became apparent that the A.F.R.C. would not
quit in May, as earlier agreed upon. Even with the guarantee of
immunity from prosecution, the A.F.R.C./R.U.F. regime contin-
ued its abuses without any restraint whatsoever. The amnesty
231. See Peace Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of
Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone, Sierra
Leone-R.U.F./S.L., Nov. 30, 1996, art. 14, available at http://www.sierra-
leone.org/abidjanaccord.html.
232. E.C.O.W.A.S. Six-Month Peace Plan for Sierra Leone: 23 October
1997-22 April 1998, Oct. 23, 1997, Economic Community of West African
States-Armed Forces Revolutionary Council, cl. 8 (1997), available at http://
www.sierra-leone.org/conakryaccord.html.
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seemed to have encouraged further abuses, since the rebels knew
that in any event, they could always renegotiate another amnesty.
The most recent peace accord followed the events of Janu-
ary 1999, when the rebels were expelled from Freetown. Presi-
dent Kabbah and Foday Sankoh signed a cease-fire agreement on
May 18, 1999 to facilitate on-going dialogue between the Parties.
Thereafter, the Government of Sierra Leone entered into peace
negotiations with the A.F.R.C./R.U.F. forces and conceded an
amnesty to the rebels. This amnesty has been the subject of
much debate.
B. The Lomi Peace Accord
23 3
The July 7, 1999 accord followed the negotiations, which
took place in Lomd, Togo, under the auspices of the incumbent
E.C.O.W.A.S. Chairman, Togo President Gnassingbe Eyadema.
The accord followed weeks of intense pressure on President Kab-
bah to come to some form of understanding with the rebels, as it
was clear that there could be no immediate military solution to
end the conflict. Countries that contributed troops to the
E.C.O.M.O.G. operation-Nigeria, Ghana, Guinea and Mali-
mounted the pressure on Kabbah because the cost of the opera-
tions was too much of a drain on their economies. Nigeria was
allegedly spending $1.1 million a day for the operation.2 3 4
In the Preamble to the Peace Agreement, the Parties note
that the Government of Sierra Leone and the R.U.F. were
"[c]ommitted to promoting full respect for human rights and
humanitarian law." The Agreement also noted the determina-
tion of the Parties "to establish sustainable peace and security; to
pledge forthwith, to settle all past, present and future differences
and grievances by peaceful means; and, to refrain from the
threat and use of armed force to bring about any change in
Sierra Leone."
235
With the above in view, the Agreement provided for pardon
and amnesty in Article IX. Paragraph 1 of Article IX mandated
the Government of Sierra Leone to "take appropriate legal steps
to grant Corporal Foday Sankoh absolute and free pardon" in
order to "bring lasting peace to Sierra Leone."2 6 The same
233. Peace Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of
Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone, Jul. 7, 1999,
Sierra Leone-R.U.F./S.L., at http://www.sierra-leone.org/lomeaccord.html
[hereinafter Lom6 Peace Accord].
234. See GETTING AWAY WITH MURDER, supra note 82, at VII.
235. See Lom6 Peace Accord, supra note 233, pmbl.
236. Id. art. IX(l).
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absolute and free pardon and reprieve was to be granted to "all
combatants and collaborators in respect of anything done by
them in pursuit of their objectives, up to the time of the signing
of the ... Agreement."237 Another sweeping clause was added to
the Agreement:
To consolidate the peace and promote the cause of
national reconciliation, the Government of Sierra Leone
shall ensure that no official or judicial action is taken
against any member of the R.U.F./S.L., ex-A.F.R.C., ex-
S.L.A. or C.D.F. in respect of anything done by them in
pursuit of their objectives as members of those organiza-
tions, since March 1991, up to the time of the signing of
the present Agreement. In addition, legislative and other
measures necessary to guarantee immunity to former com-
batants, exiles and other persons, currently outside the
country for reasons related to the armed conflict shall be
.adopted ensuring the full exercise of their civil and politi-
cal rights, with a view to their reintegration within a frame-
work of full legality.
23 8
Article IX(3) was as sweeping as it could be; it excluded eve-
ryone from prosecution for any or all violations committed since
the conflict began in 1991. At the signing of the Agreement, the
Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General, Francis
Okello, had to attach a handwritten disclaimer to the Agree-
ment, on the instructions of the UN Secretary-General,2 39 that
the "United Nations interprets that the amnesty and pardon in
article nine of [the] agreement shall not apply to international
crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and
other serious violations of international humanitarian law."
2 40
In addition to the rider attached to the Agreement, some
human rights groups took serious exception to the amnesty
clause, stating that it violated international law. 2 4 1 Within Sierra
Leone itself, many were outraged at the deal with the rebels; they
said the amnesty (and Sankoh's appointment as diamond over-
237. Id. art. IX(2).
238. Id. art. IX(3).
239. See Seventh Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer
Mission in Sierra Leone, U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/1999/836
(1999).
240. HUMAN RTs. WATCH, THE SIERRA LEONE AMNESTY UNDER INTERNA-
TIONAL LAw (Aug. 3, 1999), available at http://www.hrw.org/campaigns/sierra/
int-law2.htm [hereinafter SIERRA LEONE AMNESTY].
241. See id; see also AMNESTY INT'L, SIERRA LEONE: A PEACE AGREEMENT BUT
No JUSTICE (July 9, 1999), at http://www.web.amnesty.org/ai.nsf/index/
AFR510071999.
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lord) appeared to reward the rebels.24 2 But some in Sierra
Leone thought that any deal was preferable to a war, which had
displaced millions of people and seen some of the worst atroci-
ties committed anywhere in the world. 24" At the international
level, the immediate response of some countries, particularly the
United States and the United Kingdom, was to back the amnesty.
They argued that a deal with the rebels was the fastest and per-
haps the only practical way to end the fighting.244 The United
States committed itself to support the implementation of the
Agreement.245 But in response to the human rights community's
criticism of the amnesty provisions in the Agreement, U.S. Assis-
tant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Susan Rice, under-
scored the commitment of the United States to the pursuit of
accountability for serious violations of international humanita-
rian law everywhere in the world. 24 6 Rice maintained that the
amnesty was of a domestic nature and did not in any way obviate
the interest of the international community in seeing that crimes
against humanity, wherever they may occur, are dealt with in an
appropriate fashion.
247
Clearly, Sierra Leone has some obligations under interna-
tional law relating to ending the conflict. But what are the
nature and reach of these obligations? Is Sierra Leone bound to
deny amnesty for the offenses committed by anyone during the
conflict? Can Sierra Leone choose its own methods of dealing
with the crimes committed in the course of the conflict? And
must any method chosen conform to international law?
Ordinarily, the method a Government chooses for dealing
with the crimes committed in the course of a conflict should be
its own business. However, this is true only to some extent. In
practice, the method chosen is most likely to reflect what the
Government perceives as its strength. The more durable and sta-
ble a Government perceives itself to be, the more likely it is to
choose the option of prosecution over less invasive options like
monetary compensation to victims or families, truth commis-
242. See Mark Doyle, Peace Without Justice in Sierra Leone, BBC NEws
ONLINE, Feb. 10, 2000, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/
africa/newsid_636000/636696.stm.
243. See id.
244. See Steven Mufson, U.S. Backs Role for Rebels in W Africa: Sierra Leone
Amnesty Pushed in Peace Talks, WASH. POST, Oct. 18, 2000, at A13.
245. See Sean D. Murphy, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to
International Law, 94 Am. J. INT'L L. 348, 369-70 (2000).
246. See id; see also Susan Rice & Gayle Smith, Briefing on Africa, Washing-
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sions, enactment of lustration laws, purges that keep abusers out
of positions of public trust, or amnesty to perpetrators.2 4 8
C. Obligations of Sierra Leone Under International Law
Protocol II provides that at the close of hostilities, the
authorities in power shall grant the broadest possible amnesty to
all those who participated in the internal conflict. 24 9 The object
of this provision "is to encourage gestures of reconciliation which
can contribute to reestablishing normal relations in the life, of a
nation which has been divided."
250
In view of recent developments in the field of international
humanitarian law, particularly through the work of the two inter-
national criminal tribunals-the I.C.T.Y. and I.C.T.R.-doubts
have been cast on whether or not the amnesty applies to all
crimes committed in the course of an internal conflict. Interna-
tional humanitarian law, as applied to international armed con-
flicts, certainly obliges prosecutions of crimes committed in the
course of an armed conflict. The 1949 Geneva Conventions and
Additional Protocol I contain extensive provisions for the repres-
sion of abuses and infractions.2 5 1 State Parties to the Conven-
tions and Protocol are required to enact appropriate national
legislation for the application of penal sanctions in cases of grave
breaches and the suppression of all actions otherwise contraven-
ing humanitarian provisions.25 2
These provisions do not extend to internal armed conflicts,
but the interlocking provisions of international human rights law
and humanitarian law make it hard to argue for a blanket and
sweeping amnesty in cases of serious abuse in times of internal
armed conflicts. 25 ' Any amnesty granted pursuant to the provi-
sions of Article 6 of Protocol II would in essence be limited to the
crime of rebellion against the State, treason, or allied political
248. See Michael P. Scharf, Swapping Amnesty for Peace: Was There a Duty to
Prosecute International Crimes in Haiti?, 31 TEX. INT'L L.J. 1, 8 (1996).
249. See Protocol II, supra note 90, art. 6(5).
250. See INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL
PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949,
1402 (Yves Sandoz et al. eds., 1987).
251. See 1949 Geneva Conventions, supra note 97. Specifically, see the
First Geneva Convention, supra note 97, arts. 49-54; Second Geneva Conven-
tion, supra note 97, arts. 50-53; Third Geneva Convention, supra note 97, arts.
129-132; Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 97, arts. 146-149; Protocol I,
supra note 98, arts. 85-91. See also McCouBREY, supra note 99, at 211.
252. See MCCOUBREY, supra note 99, at 211.
253. See generally THEODOR MERON, HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNAL STRIFE:
THEIR INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION (1987); Theodor Meron, International
Criminalization of Internal Atrocities, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 554 (1995).
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offenses.2 54 It should not extend to violations of the Protocol
and the provisions of Common Article 3. Here, the Government
of Sierra Leone may have an obligation to prosecute persons for
crimes committed in the course of the conflict, but it still is a
difficult proposition that Sierra Leone cannot, under any circum-
stance, grant amnesty to the rebels.
The Government still retains its right to prosecute offenders
for violations of the law by the provisions of the same Article 6 of
Protocol 11.255 Amnesties should only be considered in excep-
tional cases, particularly where it would be helpful in realizing
the objective of facilitating the reintegration into society of those
who rose up in arms against the State. It becomes much easier to
favor an amnesty where there are no serious violations of the law.
Beyond the provisions of Protocol II relating to amnesty,
some scholars have asserted that there are emerging principles of
international law which oblige States to prosecute perpetrators of
serious violations of human rights and international humanita-
rian law.2 56 For international conflicts, that proposition does not
generate much difficulty because there are provisions in relevant
instruments that oblige States to prosecute.2 5 7 The difficulty
arises when those principles are to be applied to internal armed
conflicts where the law is not clear-cut. In these cases, some have
argued that it is difficult to make out an obligation for States to
prosecute and punish violators of the law.
25
1
As argued earlier, the conflict in Sierra Leone is more of an
internationalized internal armed conflict. Thus, it is difficult to
exclude application of the whole of international humanitarian
law from the conflict. Insofar as other States were involved in the
conflict as part of an international peace-restorative process,
international humanitarian law is applicable. The Government
was supported by the E.C.O.M.O.G. troops, while the rebels had
some measure of support from Liberia and Burkina Faso. This
certainly gives the conflict some strong international characteris-
254. See Juan E. Mndez, Accountability for Past Abuses, 19 HUM. RTS. Q.
255, 273 (1997).
255. See Protocol II, supra note 90, arts. 6(1) & (2).
256. See generally Mndez, supra note 254; ASPEN INST., STATE CRIMES: PUN-
ISHMENT OR PARDON: PAPERS AND REPORT OF THE CONFERENCE, NOVEMBER 4-6,
1988 (1989).
257. See, e.g., 1949 Geneva Conventions, supra note 97; Protocol 1, supra
note 98.
258. See, e.g., Scharf, supra note 248; see also Michael Scharf, The Letter of
the Law: The Scope of the International Legal' Obligation to Prosecute Human Rights
Crimes, 59 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 41 (1996).
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tics,259 which would make it easy to argue in favor of prosecutions
of those responsible for serious crimes.
State practice with regard to internal conflicts and their
aftermath is worth noting. In many of the internal conflicts in
the second half of the twentieth century, not much international
attention was paid to prosecuting those responsible for crimes
committed in the course of very serious internal armed conflicts.
Exceptions to this include the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia
and Rwanda, which had enough attention to warrant the estab-
lishment of criminal tribunals to try persons suspected of com-
mitting crimes in the course of the conflicts. Since these two are
the only examples, it can be argued that there is still no firm
obligation upon States to adopt any particular course of action,
and thus the law is still fluid. The selectivity inherent in the
choice of conflicts and the establishment of criminal tribunals
makes it hard to develop a definite corpus of international
humanitarian law applicable to internal armed conflicts, without
the influence of politics.
260
While it is difficult to make a hard case for one course of
conduct in Sierra Leone, it is important that those who commit-
ted atrocities not escape justice due to a steadfast adherence to
the letter of the law. The problem here is not that the acts are
not prohibited, but that there is no firm method for punishing
the crimes; this is a mere technicality that should not stand in the
way of justice. Criminals must not escape justice merely because
the law makes a distinction between international and non-inter-
national armed conflicts.
In 1999, the UN Commission on Human Rights reminded
all the Parties to the conflict in Sierra Leone that:
[I]n any armed conflict, including an armed conflict not of
an international character, the taking of hostages, willful
killing and torture or inhuman treatment of persons tak-
ing no active part in the hostilities constitutes a grave
breach of international humanitarian law, and that all
countries are under the obligation to search for persons
alleged to have committed or to have ordered to be com-
mitted, such grave breaches and bring such persons,
regardless of their nationality, before their own courts.2 6 1
259. See SIERA LEONE AMNESTY, supra note 240.
260. See Meron, International Criminalization of Internal Atrocities, supra note
253, at 555.
261. Situation of Human Rights in Sierra Leone, U.N. Commission on Hum.
Rts., 54th Sess., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/1999/1 (1999).
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This resolution by the Commission was passed before the
Lom6 Peace Accord was signed. In that Accord, amnesties were
granted just like in the other peace accords signed at various
stages, without regard for international law. This act seems to
have encouraged the rebels to continue with their utter disre-
gard for the rules applicable in armed conflict. Not only was a
sweeping amnesty granted in the Lom6 Peace Accord, but the
rebels were actually rewarded with positions in Government.
Foday Sankoh, the R.U.F. leader, was made the Chairman of the
Commission for the Management of Strategic Resources,
National Reconstruction and Development.262 This Commission
is responsible for the management of Sierra Leone's mineral
resources of Sierra Leone, which have been identified as the
main source of the conflict. In addition to being granted
amnesty, Sankoh was definitely being rewarded for his rebellion.
Additionally, a Commission for the Consolidation of Peace
was established pursuant to the Lom6 Peace Accord.2 6 The
chairman of that Commission is the leader of the A.F.R.C.,
Johnny Paul Koroma, who overthrew President Kabbah in a mili-
tary coup in May 1997 and presided over a state of terror while in
power. In the name of peace, Koroma was granted amnesty
under the Conakry and Lom6 Peace Accords. These acts demon-
strate that the main concern of the Government of Sierra Leone
was achieving peace, possibly at the expense of justice for the
victims of the atrocities committed by these men.
Despite its relative weakness, the Government of Sierra
Leone did try to achieve justice for the victims of these atrocities.
It conducted a series of prosecutions in 1998 after the restoration
of President Kabbah to office. The Nigerian authorities, which
had held Sankoh in detention since 1997, released Sankoh in
1998 to the authorities in Sierra Leone. This was after Kabbah's
restoration to power. Sankoh was immediately arrested upon
arrival in Freetown and charged with treason, for which he was
tried and found guilty. Thus, as far as the duty to prosecute goes,
the Government of Sierra Leone at least partially complied with
its obligation. Sankoh was sentenced to death at the end of the
trial, but had to be released to take part in the peace negotiations
in 1999.
The charges against Sankoh were restricted to treason. If
this were the only charge for which he could be tried, an amnesty
would not be easily challenged. For a man that directed the con-
flict and oversaw so many atrocities, treason charges are not
262. See Lom Peace Accord, supra note 233, art. VII(12).
263. See id. art. VI.
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enough. Treason, rebellion, and sedition are like-offenses and
can be the subject of amnesty encouraged by Protocol II. In
March 1996, while in C6te d'Ivoire, Sankoh publicly admitted
that the R.U.F. had committed atrocities. 264 Other charges
ought to have been brought against him, particularly those relat-
ing to atrocities against the civilian population, who were seri-
ously affected by the conflict.
In 1998, the Government also detained several hundred
individuals on suspicion of treason and other charges stemming
from their involvement with the A.F.R.C./R.U.F. regime. Some
individuals were released, and at least 103 persons were tried in
four civilian trials and one court-martial proceeding. All of the
trials were open to the public and the verdicts ranged from
acquittals on all charges to guilty; the sentences ranged from five
years imprisonment to execution. Twenty-four former army
officers convicted of treason charges subsequently were
executed.265
D. Achieving Peace Through Accountability and Justice
The Government of Sierra Leone is caught in between the
proverbial rock and a hard place. The structures of governance
are weak and the State does not have total control of its territory.
This has affected its dealings with the rebel forces since 1998,
and particularly, since the aftermath of the rebel offensive
against Freetown in January 1999. The Government has had to
come to some understanding with the rebels, particularly with
Foday Sankoh, who was tried for treason and had to be released
for the sake of peace. The Government carried out prosecutions
in 1998, but these also did not help to ease the tensions in the
country. With help from the international community, the Gov-
ernment of Sierra Leone could have asserted itself and reclaimed
its lost authority. Support from E.C.O.W.A.S. has been crucial at
various stages, but without sufficient resources of their own, the
264. See AMNESTY INT'L, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT 1997 279.
265. See SIERRA LEONE COUNTY' REPORT 1998, supra note 213, at 369-70.
The U.S. State Department Report noted that observers generally agreed that
the proceedings were conducted in a fair and open manner and that the
defendants had adequate opportunities for counsel and to make their cases.
But see AMNESTY INT'L, SIERRA LEONE: EXECUTIONS OF 24 SOLDIERS AFTER AN
UNFAIR TRIAL: A BLOW TO RECONCILIATION IN SIERRA LEONE (Oct. 20, 1998),
available at http://www.web.amnesty.org/ai.nsf/index/AFR510201998. In this
press release, Amnesty International (AI) deplored the executions after con-
demning the trials as "unfair." It is hard to comprehend the criticism of AL,
knowing fully well that the Government of Sierra Leone was trying to do its best
in pursuing justice against the accused persons.
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ability of those countries to radically affect the situation has been
limited. It is evident that more needs to be done for Sierra
Leone to achieve stability in the country.
The UN became involved in the conflict with the establish-
ment of the United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone
(U.N.O.M.S.I.L.) in June 1998.266 The mandate of
U.N.O.M.S.I.L. included responsibility for monitoring and help-
ing E.C.O.M.O.G. with the implementation of a program for the
disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of combatants
(D.D.R.); reporting on the security situation; and monitoring
respect for international humanitarian laws. In October 1999,
the UN Security Council authorized the creation of the United
Nations Assistance Mission in Sierra Leone (U.N.A.M.S.I.L.) to
assist the Government and the Parties in carrying out provisions
of the Lom6 peace agreement. 267 At the same time, the Security
Council decided to terminate U.N.O.M.S.I.L. The mandate of
U.N.A.M.S.I.L. is similar to that of U.N.O.M.S.I.L., except that it
has a strong military component, which is intended to fill the gap
created by the departure of Nigerian troops from Sierra Leone.
The efforts by the UN, though in the right direction, were
too little and too late. The Security Council, in Resolution 1270,
determined that the situation in Sierra Leone continued to be a
threat to international peace and security, just like it did in the
case of the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. However, the Secur-
ity Council did not create a mechanism to restore peace beyond
the establishment of U.N.A.M.S.I.L. There was a need to
strengthen the hands of the Government of President Kabbah,
but that was not done. It engaged in mere platitudes, which did
not help in the search for peace through justice.
For Sierra Leone to move forward and achieve lasting peace,
there must be prosecutions of those responsible for the atrocities
committed in the course of the conflict. It is not enough to pros-
ecute the criminals for treason. There must also be a reckoning
for the serious crimes committed, particularly against the civilian
population. That way, there would be justice for the victims, and
the country should be in a position to lay the ghosts of the past to
rest.
The amnesty granted by the Lom6 Peace Accord was a step
in the wrong direction. If it is not possible to reverse it, there
must be efforts to undertake international prosecutions of the
leadership of the rebel groups and leaders, including Foday
266. See U.N. SCOR, 53d Sess., Res. 1181, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1181 (1998).
267. See U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess., Res. 1270, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1270
(1999).
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Sankoh. Thus, it is up to the UN Security Council to establish a
war crimes tribunal to prosecute those responsible for the
crimes. If there is insufficient political will to establish a tribunal,
the will must be found. This is not a case of asking for troops
from Western nations to police Sierra Leone. Even if there is
sufficient political will, the Governments in those countries may
not be able to mobilize public opinion to accept the real sacri-
fices of blood and treasure necessary for such military action in a
country like Sierra Leone, which holds no strategic interest or
advantage for them.268
As the law stands, amnesties for crimes, such as those com-
mitted in Sierra Leone, should not be upheld outside of Sierra
Leone. They are of questionable legality and can only serve the
short-term interest of achieving immediate peace. 269 This fact is
borne out by the fact that since the amnesty was declared, rebel
abuses have continued. 27" There has been no real peace. The
first few months of 2000 have seemed to vindicate those who
opposed the amnesty. And the victims are not restricted to
Sierra Leoneans.271
The peculiar nature of the conflict also calls for some mea-
sure of penal sanctions against the perpetrators of the atrocities.
This has never been an ethnic conflict; instead, it has roots in the
quest for control of the mineral resources of Sierra Leone. The
rebels and their foreign backers are illegally mining the land.
Such banditry and stealing should neither be rewarded with
amnesty nor with political positions, such as the ones the rebel
268. Cf Reisman, supra note 227, at 31.
269. See DINAH SHELTON, REMEDIES IN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
326 (1999).
270. See HUMAN RTS. WATCH, REBEL ABUSES NEAR SIERRA LEONE CAPITAL:
UNITED NATIONS SHOULD ACT, SAYS RIGHTS GROUP (Mar. 3, 2000), at http://
www.hrw.org/campaigns/sierra/index.htm; HUMAN RTs. WATCH, SIERRA LEONE
REBELS VIOLATING PEACE ACCORD: REBEL LEADERS URGED TO PUNISH PERPETRA-
TORS (Oct. 27, 1999), at http://www.hrw.org/hrw/press/1999/oct/
sierra1027.htm. See also HUMAN RTS. WATCH, MEMO ON THE RECENT VIOLATIONS
OF THE LOMt PEACE ACCORD (Jan. 23, 2000), at http://www.hrw.org/hrw/cam-
paigns/sierra/mem0100.htm.
271. On May 2, 2000, at least seven UN peacekeepers were killed and
three wounded in clashes with R.U.F. rebels. See Pledge to Release UN Troops, BBC
NEWS ONLINE, May 3, 2000, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/
world/africa/newsid_734000/734911.stm. Another 92 peacekeepers and other
UN staff had been captured earlier. See Sierra Leone Protesters Shot, BBC NEWS
ONLINE, May 97, 2000, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/
africa/newsid_740000/740844.stm. On May 4, 2000, six UN staff members
were freed by the rebels, but 208 Zambian peacekeepers were detained. On
May 6, 2000, another 226 Zambian peacekeepers were missing; all abducted by
the rebel R.U.F. forces. Id.
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leaders hold at present. In recent times, the value of official
annual diamond exports by Sierra Leone has been halved to $30
million. In the same period, diamond exports by Liberia, which
possesses relatively few diamond fields, has dramatically risen to
$300 million.272 The rebels have been the means for looting and
plundering the resources that belong to the people of Sierra
Leone.
By the terms of the Lom6 Peace Accord, the Government of
Sierra Leone was to establish a truth and reconciliation commis-
sion, address impunity, break the cycle of violence, provide a
forum for both the victims and perpetrators of human rights vio-
lations to tell their story, and get a clear picture of the past in
order to facilitate genuine healing and reconciliation.273 Pursu-
ant to that objective, in February 2000, the Parliament of Sierra
Leone approved legislation creating the Truth and Reconcilia-
tion Commission for Sierra Leone.2 74 The Commission is seen as
part of the efforts to achieve healing and reconciliation in Sierra
Leone. However, the Commission is still in the process of creat-
ing a constitution, and it is not yet functional.
If the Commission functions as intended, it may help restore
normalcy to Sierra Leone. But if the prescription of the Truth
Commission is to avoid the issues of accountability, particularly
prosecutions, then it may turn out to be an unnecessary effort.
In this case, the truth concerning the abuses and the identity of
the perpetrators is not hidden. For anyone to hope for forgive-
ness, there must be reflection, judgment, and accountability for
the past.2 75 This work, however, is not about pre-judging the
272. See David Bamford, Foday Sankoh: Rebel Leader, BBC NEWS ONLINE,
May 5, 2000, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/africa/new-
sid_737000/737268.stm. In 1998, the Government of Sierra Leone recorded
diamond exports of only 8,500 carats, but the Hoge Raad voor Diamant
(H.R.D.)-the Diamond High Council-recorded imports of 770,000 carats.
The annual Liberian diamond mining capacity is between 100,000 and 150,000
carats, but the H.R.D. recorded Liberian exports into Belgium of over 31 mil-
lion carats between 1994 and 1998, an average of over six million carats a year.
C6te d'Ivoire, where the small diamond industry was closed in the mid-1980s,
apparently exported an average of more than 1.5 million carats to Belgium
between 1995 and 1997. See Smillie, supra note 3.
273. See Lom6 Peace Accord, supra note 230, art. XXVI.
274. See The Truth and Reconciliation Commission Act 2000 (Sierra
Leone), available at http://www.sierra-leone.org/trc.html.
275. See generally John J. Moore, Jr., Note, Problems with Forgiveness: Grant-
ing Amnesty Under the Arias Plan in Nicaragua and El Salvador, 43 STAN. L. REV.
733 (1991) (noting the comments of a criminologist discussing the case of El
Salvador:
Inherent in social consciousness are the intertwined demands for
truth and justice. These two issues can be translated practically into
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impending work of the Commission. The Commission may still
be effective in dealing with the issues assigned to it by the Act.
Apart from the Truth Commission, there are other initia-
tives that the Government of Sierra Leone may pursue in giving
partial satisfaction to its people. 276 The Government may file an
official apology to the victims of the conflict on behalf of the
State that has failed to offer them minimum protection against
the predators that literally destroyed their lives.277 In this case,
since the victims are numerous, the State may consider offering a
national apology to all Sierra Leoneans.
The Government of Sierra Leone may also consider paying
monetary compensation to all identified victims and/or their
families. A mechanism like the Truth and Reconciliation Com-
mission may be used to identify the proper person(s) to receive
the desire to see the truth established and the desire for punishment.
It's a mysteriously powerful, almost magic notion, because in many
cases almost everyone knows the truth. Everyone, for example, may
know who the human rights abusers are and what they did; and the
abusers know that everyone knows, and everyone knows that they
know. Yet there remains a need to make everything explicit. Nagel, a
legal philosopher, states "It's the difference between knowledge and
acknowledgement.");
Id. at 763 n.185 (citing William Calathes, Salvadoran Amnesty: Criminology and the
Development of a "Just"Justice System, Paper Presented at the First International
Conference ofJurists Sponsored by the Salvadoran Institute of Legal Studies in
San Salvador, El Salvador, 7-8 (Dec. 7-9, 1990)).
276. See Bassiouni, supra note 224, at 19; see also SHELTON, supra note 269,
at 345-56.
277. The R.U.F. and the A.F.R.C. have at various times offered some apol-
ogy to the people of Sierra Leone. In June 1997, the R.U.F. tendered an apol-
ogy for the atrocities committed against Sierra Leoneans during the war. See
Revolutionary United Front's Apology to the Nation (June 18, 1997), available at
http://www.sierra-leone.org/rufapology.html. In September 1999, the A.F.R.C.
offered an apology for "wrongs and misdeeds" it committed, while stating its
demands. See Position Statement of the Sierra Leone Army (S.L.A.) and the Armed
Forces Revolutionary Council (A.F.RC.) (Sept. 18, 1999), available at http://
www.sierra-leone.org/afrc091899.html.
The leader of the A.F.R.C., Johnny Paul Koroma, asked the people of
Sierra Leone to forgive his men for the atrocities they might have committed.
See Personal Statement by Lt. Col. JP. Koroma (Oct. 1, 1999), available at http://
www.sierra-leone.org/koromalOO199.html (emphasis added). Finally, the lead-
ers of the R.U.F./S.L. and A.F.R.C. alliance tendered an apology to the nation
in October 1999, as they announced that they would transform the alliance into
a political party. See Statement on the Historic Return to Freetown, Sierra Leone, of the
Leaders of the Alliance of the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone and the Armed
Forces Revolutionary Council (Oct. 3, 1999), available at http://www.sierra-
leone.org/afrc-ruf%20statement.html. These series of apologies would have
been meaningful if they had not been followed by more atrocities against the
same people to whom they apologized. In effect, the apology was cosmetic and
there was no genuine repentance for their evil acts.
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compensation. But as the State is poor and lacks the necessary
resources to pay any meaningful compensation, it may have to
pay token sums in recognition of the damage suffered by the
people. One proposition would be for an international fund, to
which States and other willing donors could contribute, from
which the compensation can be paid in order to help Sierra
Leone back to normalcy. Granted, it would be difficult to con-
vince States to give any kind of support to Sierra Leone at this
stage. It would also be hard to persuade other States to use their
taxpayers' money to compensate victims of brutality in another
country for violence, which the donor Governments cannot be
held directly responsible. Even in the absence of necessary
funds, the Government of Sierra Leone may still create a memo-
rial fund in the memory of dead victims, and some part of the
annual budget of Sierra Leone could be placed into the fund for
payment to the relatives of the deceased.
Laws should be passed by the Government of Sierra Leone
to allow individuals who suffered any kind of damage to sue
those whom they can identify as being responsible for their con-
dition in a civil proceeding. The Government may also create a
national park for all victims of the conflict with a roll of names of
all that suffered one kind of injury or damage or another. It
could also order a national holiday in honor of the victims, mark-
ing it a day of reconciliation as well. Official acknowledgement
of the wrong suffered may go some way in assuaging the grief of
the victims, particularly since they may not see the prosecution of
those responsible for their fate.278
The Government of Sierra Leone must make all efforts to
address the structural imbalances in society that afforded the
rebels the excuse for their initial attack. It must promote a
strong civil society and rehabilitate those who have surrendered
their arms. Children who took part in the conflict need special
care so that they can return to a normal life to whatever extent
possible. The Government must make a provision for free and
compulsory education for all children of school age in order to
help them to avoid a life of crime.
The international community must also take a part in help-
ing Sierra Leone in its present situation. The neglect suffered by
Sierra Leone is indicative of the neglect suffered by the African
continent as a whole. When the UN High Commissioner for
278. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission may adopt some of these
as part of the remedial measures it has power to recommend by virtue of Sec-
tion 15(2) of the enabling Act. See The Truth and Reconciliation Commission
Act 2000, supra note 274, art. 15(2).
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Human Rights, Mary Robinson, visited Sierra Leone in June
1999, she said there had been more loss of life in Sierra Leone
than in Kosovo-more suffering, more mutilations, and more
violations of human rights. Yet, Sierra Leone did not get a frac-
tion of the attention devoted to Kosovo, even though the January
rebel offensive against Freetown happened about the same time
events were unfolding in Kosovo.
279
Cash constraints hampered efforts made by the U.N.H.C.R.
to take care of the victims of the conflict, particularly the refugee
population. According to Human Rights Watch (H.R.W.), "[i]t
seem [s] axiomatic that international efforts to assist refugees and
seek solutions to their plight should be equitable and based on
human need, regardless of the nationality, race, geographic,
political, or military importance of the refugee population."28 °
H.R.W. notes that no African refugee population, including
those from Sierra Leone, received anything near the outpouring
of international concern and assistance demonstrated during the
Kosovo crisis. One estimate calculated that in Africa, $0.11 was
spent per refugee per day by the international community, com-
pared to $1.23 per Balkan refugee per day; Kosovar refugees in
Albania and Macedonia received $10 million per week.
U.N.H.C.R.'s annual appeal for West Africa, which had a large
Sierra Leone refugee population, set a $9 million goal, but raised
only $1.3 million in pledges.281
Thus, there must be a great measure of international assis-
tance for Sierra Leone to assert itself against internal and exter-
nal aggressors. As noted, the international community must not
accept the amnesty and must make all efforts to see that the lead-
ers of the rebel groups face international justice. It would also be
beneficial to Sierra Leone if the international community
assisted in the rebuilding of the judicial system, adding to cur-
rent efforts by the Government of the United Kingdom to help
rebuild the armed forces of Sierra Leone.28 2 All these efforts
must complement each other for Sierra Leone to be able to
achieve the goal of peace through justice.
E. Conclusions
This work has examined the conflict in Sierra Leone, a con-
flict not based on issues of ethnicity as in many African countries,
279. See Mark Doyle, Sierra Leone: Worse than Kosovo?, BBC NEws ONUNE,
July 3, 1999, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/
fromour__own correspondent/newsid_383000/383985.stm.
280. H.R.W. WoRLD REPORT 2000, supra note 187, at 21.
281. Id. at 22.
282. See id. at 72.
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but driven solely by greed on the part of the rebels. The com-
plexity of the problem is what makes it difficult to prescribe any
particular solution as being the best for the country. In the end,
the country must work out a solution that fits it best. In doing
this, it must bear in mind the requirements of international law
and the interests of its citizens. It cannot simply legislate or take
actions for reasons of political expediency or survival; that would
only create another set of problems. The country cannot thrive
on the injustice to the rebellion victims, and the country cannot
adopt collective amnesia to forget all that happened in the
course of the conflict.
The problems raised by the conflict in Sierra Leone tran-
scend international humanitarian law; they involve human rights
and refugee issues as well. They are interrelated, and proposing
one solution does not negate the requirements of the other
branches of the law. If only the international community would
assist, Sierra Leone should be able to rise above its present
problems. There is a need to address the issues relating to the
exploitation of Sierra Leone's mineral resources by outside
forces, particularly the alleged involvement of Liberia in the min-
ing of Sierra Leonian diamonds. This is well beyond the scope of
this work and is being addressed by others.
28 3
In dealing with issues of accountability for violations of inter-
national humanitarian law, Sierra Leone must be given some lati-
tude in deciding what course to take; in particular, if
international assistance is not forthcoming. The UN
peacekeepers presently on ground may still have some relevant
work to do. However, it is doubtful that they can make much
difference, for they are only bearing light arms, as the original
intention of the Security Council was that they would supervise
the disarmament of the warring groups. Now that they are facing
challenges from the rebel forces, it remains to be seen whether
they will have a more robust mandate, such as arresting the lead-
ers of the rebel groups, including Sankoh and Koroma.
Whatever interpretation comes out as best in relation to the
amnesty in the Lom6 Peace Accord, efforts must be made to
prosecute those responsible for the commission of heinous
crimes after the amnesty was granted. The amnesty was granted
with respect to anything done from March 1991, "up to the time
of the signing of the . . . Agreement." 284 Thus, anything done
after the agreement was signed is not covered. Therefore, it is
necessary that those responsible for new crimes should be prose-
283. See, e.g., Smillie, supra note 3.
284. LomL6 Peace Accord, supra note 233, art. IX (3).
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cuted and punished if found guilty. There must be accountabil-
ity, and no one should be spared. It is clear that the original
amnesty was ill-conceived, even if the Government of Sierra
Leone conceded it in good faith. While abuses by other sides in
the conflict have been held to a minimal level, the R.U.F. has not
spared the civilian populace, who is now open to attacks from the
rebels, as the country is being patrolled by lightly armed UN
peacekeepers.
Additionally, one can argue that the recent acts of Foday
Sankoh and his rebels are a repudiation of the peace agreement.
A breach by one party effectively releases the other party from its
obligations under the same agreement. The amnesty remained
effective so long as the Parties respected the terms of the agree-
ment. As this is no longer the case, Sankoh is open to prosecu-
tion by an international tribunal if one were established to
prosecute crimes committed in the course of the conflict. In the
absence of prosecution by Sierra Leone, it is also open to any
State, under the principle of universal jurisdiction, to try and
punish Foday Sankoh or any of his allies for those crimes. The
net around him should be tightened to ensure that he does not
escape justice.
The Lom( Peace Accord is fast unraveling and the interna-
tional community should not sit idly by and watch Sierra Leone
disintegrate under the nose of the UN peacekeepers. Western
countries have had no interest in the peacekeeping operations
beyond composing a force ill-equipped for the operations in
Sierra Leone. Yet since the attack on the peacekeepers and the
subsequent threatening by the rebels of an attack on the capital,
Freetown, the U.K. authorities have found sufficient troops to
undertake the evacuation of foreign nationals from Sierra Leone.
This sends a wrong signal that the Western nations are only inter-
ested in their nationals, and that is the only purpose for which
they will send forces into Sierra Leone.
The failure to establish a war crimes tribunal for the crimes
committed in the conflict in Sierra Leone does not help the
development of the law. If there are emerging norms that
require punishment of this class of offenses that have been, and
are still being, committed in Sierra Leone, then those norms
must be applied in this case. Failure to do so makes it hard to
argue that Sierra Leone has an obligation, when in fact it cannot,
and is not, in a position to discharge the obligation. The conflict
in Kosovo, which admittedly is not as bad as what happened in
Sierra Leone, is being addressed by the I.C.T.Y. The law in this
regard seems to be developing to favor those whom the Western
powers and the five permanent members of the UN Security
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Council are interested. It will be a sad thing if these crimes
remain unpunished.
Sierra Leone itself must make the best efforts to prosecute
those it can, even if it cannot prosecute all of the criminals.
Recent events show that if it does not make those efforts, no mat-
ter how minimal, those who cry out for justice for victims in
Europe will not help the victims in Sierra Leone. And very
surely, if the path of justice is not neglected in the search for
peace, peace may come, and Sierra Leone could still become the
prosperous and peaceful country it should be.
POSTSCRIPT
Events in Sierra Leone have taken different turns, some for
the better. The UN has shown a little more interest in the issues
since the incidents involving its troops on the ground in Sierra
Leone. The Security Council has authorized the establishment
of a special international court to try persons accused of serious
violations of international humanitarian law in the conflict in
Sierra Leone.2" 5 In the resolution, the UN Secretary-General was
asked to negotiate an agreement with the Government of Sierra
Leone to create an "independent special court" and report back
to the Security Council within a specified period.2" 6 That court is
being constituted.
The decision of the Security Council to support the U.S.-
sponsored resolution marked another stage in the quest for jus-
tice in Sierra Leone. It is a welcome development, one that must
be fully utilized in order to ensure the return of peace to the
country. While there is a strong desire for justice, care must be
taken to ensure that the process is not abused and that accused
persons receive a fair trial.
It is also worthy to note that the A.F.R.C. of Johnny Paul
Koroma has been disbanded. Koroma is now a very active mem-
ber of the Kabbah Government and is overseeing disarmament
and demobilization of rebel soldiers in Sierra Leone.287 Also,
since the arrest of Foday Sankoh, the worst has not happened;
even though the war has continued, it has not been on the scale
that was predicted following the arrest of Sankoh. The rebels
285. See U.N. SCOR, 55th Sess., Res. 1315, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1315
(2000).
286. See id.
287. See War Crimes Tribunal for Sierra Leone, BBC NEws ONLINE, Aug. 14,
2000, available at http://newsvote.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/africa/new-
sid_879000/879825.htm.
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have chosen a new leader to replace Sankoh, and it appears that
they are able to continue the war despite his absence.
The Governments of the West African sub-region are also
unrelenting in their efforts to see the return of peace to Sierra
Leone. While they support calls for the trial of Sankoh and his
men, they are maintaining the dual track approach initiated by
Kabbah, working toward peace through justice and also through
reconciliation with the rebels, inasmuch as they show interest in
the peace efforts.
